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The effects of individual disengagement on insurgency campaigns

Weber, Matthew W.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT ON INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS

by

Matthew W. Weber

December 2010

Thesis Advisor:	Michael Freeman
Second Reader:	Leo Blanken

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What are the effects of individual disengagement on an insurgency campaign? Current research does not articulate the consequences experienced, more broadly, when an individual fighter departs from violence. Because of this shortcoming, disengagement programs are often poorly timed and make inefficient use of resources. That being said, disengagement has the potential to be an influential component of comprehensive counterinsurgency efforts when it is properly used to inhibit an insurgency campaign's ability to operate efficiently. This thesis considers the manner in which individual disengagement accomplishes this by affecting the psychological and social processes of the fighters that remain, and having extensive impacts on the campaign's human and social capital, as well as its ability to conduct operations. Finally, it considers the extent to which the insurgency's lifecycle stage, its leadership, and its ideology influence these phenomena. This analysis concludes by suggesting that disengagement behavior will spread through expressive networks by way of social contagion. Furthermore, while disengagement programs will have certain impacts as an insurgency grows, they will most effectively catalyze the demise of a campaign during stages of decline.

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THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT ON INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS

Matthew W. Weber
Major, United States Army
B.B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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December 2010

Author: Matthew W. Weber

Approved by: Michael Freeman
Thesis Advisor

Leo Blanken
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

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What are the effects of individual disengagement on an insurgency campaign? Current research does not articulate the consequences experienced, more broadly, when an individual fighter departs from violence. Because of this shortcoming, disengagement programs are often poorly timed and make inefficient use of resources. That being said, disengagement has the potential to be an influential component of comprehensive counterinsurgency efforts when it is properly used to inhibit an insurgency campaign's ability to operate efficiently. This thesis considers the manner in which individual disengagement accomplishes this by affecting the psychological and social processes of the fighters that remain, and having extensive impacts on the campaign's human and social capital, as well as its ability to conduct operations. Finally, it considers the extent to which the insurgency's lifecycle stage, its leadership, and its ideology influence these phenomena. This analysis concludes by suggesting that disengagement behavior will spread through expressive networks by way of social contagion. Furthermore, while disengagement programs will have certain impacts as an insurgency grows, they will most effectively catalyze the demise of a campaign during stages of decline.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIS – Islamic Salvation Army

EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad

FIS – Algerian Islamic Salvation Front

GIA – Armed Islamic Group

GIRoA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GOM – Government of Malaya

GVN – Government of South Vietnam

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

MCP – Malayan Communist Party

MPAJA – Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army

PTS – Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission

VC – Viet Cong

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I. PREVIOUS THOUGHTS ON DISENGAGEMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

Disengagement has profound effects on an organization. Only one person may walk away from violence in the beginning, but this single act soon has a significant impact on the rest of the organization. One individual's psychological process suddenly compels a social process that manifests itself in both individual and group phenomena. This is the most intriguing aspect of disengagement. In the struggle against insurgent organizations, disengagement defeats more than just a single combatant; it has the potential to precipitate the decline of entire organizations and movements. For this reason, disengagement holds much potential and its complexities must be appreciated.

The possibilities disengagement represents are unlike killing or capturing an adversary; it is much more than the removal of one single fighter. When individuals disengage from violence voluntarily, they express clear dissatisfaction with the organization and how involvement in it is affecting their lives. The insurgent who opts to disengage sees a better alternative. For the insurgency campaign more broadly, the question becomes: How do other members of the group react to this move? Do friends and followers continue to pledge their support to the organization and its objectives, or does one individual's decision give them pause and similar behavior becomes contagious among other members in the insurgent network? Although the answers to these questions will depend greatly on the characteristics of the disengaged, and the organization from which they come, they are sure to be to the campaign's detriment.

Disengagement has the potential to catalyze the demise of insurgent organizations when it produces consequences that inhibit these groups' ability to operate efficiently and with precision. Complete organizational collapse will not always result from individual members disengaging from violence. That is not to say they cannot be a useful component of a broader counterinsurgency initiative. The U.S. has attempted several different disengagement programs in past counterinsurgencies. Other countries have also done so with varying degrees of success in other contexts. In order to have the greatest

opportunity for success, pursuit of a disengagement strategy must be informed by the potential it has to reduce violence and combat insurgencies. Appreciation of the organizational, leadership, and growth state dynamics in an insurgency will help accomplish objectives in a manner whereby resources are efficiently devoted to strategies that reduce insurgents' capacity to conduct violent activities.

B. BACKGROUND

Much study has been devoted to the processes of deradicalization in persons who profess extremist ideologies, and more recently, to disengagement from violence. Whereas deradicalization is a social and psychological process whereby an individual no longer believes in a violent ideology[1] and has been the aim of most programs designed to undermine organizations based on ideology, disengagement is distinct in that it does not require ideological change or denunciation. Disengagement occurs when an individual experiences a change in role that involves cessation of violent activities.

Government and military programs that promote disengagement from violence can target the collective group, and/or individual members. Individual disengagement tactics include various forms of overtures to organizational leaders and senior level commanders, mid-level bosses and resource managers, or lower level group members. To the extent individuals accept these and disengage, there are likely to be impacts on other members in the organization and the organization as a whole. The degree of impact is likely to correspond to the nature of disengaged members' network ties, as well as the formal or informal influence an individual holds within an organization. Regardless of level, disengagement is a highly contextualized activity affected not only by personal relationships, but the social, political, and economic environment as well. The overall context must be appreciated or disengagement is likely to result in the misapplication of vital resources to no operational or strategic end.

In this thesis, I propose a set of principles to be used as guidelines to use in consideration of the objectives, timing, and formulation of disengagement strategies. Using studies of previous military disengagement programs aimed at reducing violence in

[1] John Horgan, *Walking* Away *from Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, 2009, 152–153.

counterinsurgency campaigns, I will analyze the extent to which the effects of disengagement on insurgent organizations successfully achieved a reduction in the level of violence.

C. HYPOTHESIS

The following preliminary hypotheses were used to inform the forthcoming literature review. They will be elaborated upon prior to the presentation of the case studies used in this paper.

Hypothesis 1: I deduce that an individual's decision to leave an insurgency campaign and disengage from violence has effects on the persons in the organization with whom they have relationships. These effects will be greater when the reason for disengagement represents a faltering of belief that resounds with their associates.

Hypothesis 2: The more rank an individual enjoys in an insurgent organization, the more people they are able to influence by way of greater network centrality and significance of relationships; the impact of each interaction is greater as the individual's rank carries relatively greater influence. Accordingly, the organizational impact of a fighter's disengagement will be greater with increased rank.

Hypothesis 3: The effects of disengagement by high-ranking individuals on other persons will be more significant and more negative when the organization's lifecycle stage is one of growth, rather than when it is in a state of decline. Organizational growth refers to the overall trend of the organization's violent activities and is irrespective of its overall size. Growth will be perceived to be demonstrative of the ideology's legitimacy and the leadership's ability to be successful. Therefore, individuals in positions of influence will enjoy a relatively greater level of confidence and this enhanced confidence will lead to more profound effects when they decide to disengage.

Hypothesis 4: Conversely, when the organization's strength is in a state of relative decline, irrespective of size, higher-ranking individuals will have reduced levels of influence. The subsequent effects of disengagement by subordinate members, however, will be greater during this time. Subordinates will perceive they have been failed by the

insurgency and will seek to gain the benefits offered by disengagement, whether they are social, financial, or legal incentives. This will have a contagion effect on other lower level members who view it in their best interests to also disengage before the organization declines any further. In this case, they fear that the organization will eventually fall apart and leave them without protection and a missed opportunity to benefit from government disengagement incentives.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Process of Disengagement

The concepts of deradicalization and disengagement are distinctly different in the end state they seek and the strategies they employ. Of the two, deradicalization techniques have been more prevalent in attempts to reform persons with extremist views—most recently, those associated with radical Islamism. Deradicalization programs make the assumption that extremist ideologies legitimize and advocate violence on their behalf. As long as ideological beliefs persist in the minds of believers, they will seek to redress their sense of injustice and grievances against the perceived wrongdoer. Therefore, these programs seek to dismantle this belief system.[2] In the case of radical Islamists, for example, deradicalization programs employ Islamic scholars for their "epistemic authority" in the eyes of prospective converts. These scholarly authorities engage in religious dialogue with program's subjects in order to counter the notion that Islam condones terrorism against civilians[3] and convince them their terrorist organizations egregiously twist the pillars of Islam.

The process of disengagement, conversely, recognizes a distinction in behavioral and cognitive processes. John Horgan describes disengagement as a process whereby an individual or group no longer engages in violence. The ideological change that is a

[2] Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele Gelfand, and Rohan Gunaratna, "Detainee Deradicalization: A Challenge for Psychological Science," *Association for Psychological Science Observer* 23, no. 1 (January 2010).

[3] Arie W. Kruglanski, A. Raviv, D. Bar-Tal, A. Raviv, K. Sharvit, S. Ellis, et al. 2005, "Says Who? Epistemic Authority Effects in Social Judgment," In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, edited by M.P. Zanna, vol. 37, 346–392, New York: Academic Press.

feature of deradicalization does not necessarily follow.[4] According to Horgan, factors in the disengagement process include both psychological and physical issues.[5] Often, the instance occurs when the behavioral change that accompanies physical disengagement from terrorism is not accompanied by a psychological change or reduction in ideological support, or influence over the individual by the ideology.[6] An individual may be disengaged from violence but not be repentant at all.[7] Additionally, he suggests that the pathway to disengagement is not the same for everyone, nor does the individual experience the same qualities.[8]

2. The Psychology of Moving Away From Violence

Renee Garfinkel detailed the prevailing social and cognitive processes associated with the psychological change involved in a departure from violence. Her series of interviews with seven former members of violent religious extremist groups discovered it to be a process in which the individual felt vulnerable, and was often brought about by stress, crisis, and trauma.[9] This event frequently involved a perceived failure in their values and beliefs. The subsequent change was one that took place by degrees and found that actual acceptance of the 'enemy' is a process that takes place over time. She also discovered the absence of an authority figure in the individuals' movement away from violence, but did observe that change was often contingent on a personal friend or mentor that affirmed peaceful behavior. Finally, each individual experienced the loss of friendships and a period of isolation until s/he was able to develop new relationships and a different social network.[10]

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[4] Horgan, *Walking Away*, 17, 19.

[5] John Horgan, "Deradicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 4 (February 2008): 3–8, 4–5.

[6] Horgan, "Deradicalization or Disengagement," 5.

[7] Horgan, *Walking Away*, 27.

[8] Horgan, "Deradicalization or Disengagement," 5.

[9] Renee Garfinkel, "Personal Transformations: Moving From Violence To Peace," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 186 (April 2007), 1.

[10] Garfinkel, "Personal Transformations," 11–13.

3. Departure from Violent Anti-social Groups

A number of previous studies have focused on these processes for individuals of various anti-social groups. Although these groups differ in their ideologies and objectives, the factors and processes involved in their members leaving have proven to be very similar. This suggests that lessons learned in studies of racist groups, religious cults, and criminal youth gangs can be thoughtfully applied to the study of terrorist groups.

In his study of right wing racist groups, Tore Bjorgo recognizes that most activists consider leaving their organization at some point. In making the decision to lead a normal life, they consider both push and pull factors. Push factors are negative circumstances or social forces that make it unappealing to remain in a particular group. He suggests these might include negative social sanctions, disillusionment with the organization or its ideology, or burnout resulting from constant pressure. Pull factors, on the other hand, are those that make an alternative more attractive than present circumstance. These often appeal to an activist's longing for a normal life or a desire to establish a family and accept spousal and parental roles.[11]

Despite the presence of these incentives, Bjorgo emphasizes that involvement in the group may still entail sufficient factors that discourage leaving. This frequently has to do with the positive characteristics of friendship and social support. At times, even when faith in ideology is lost, an individual stays with a group because of strong friendship and social bonds. Activists also contemplate the risks of leaving that might include negative sanctions from the group and loss of protection from former adversaries. Additionally, an activist may fear an isolated return to their former life, as social ties were likely broken when s/he joined the group. As a result, although they consider quitting, members of racist groups may elect to stay if they consider it a more attractive alternative.[12]

Extensive research on youth gangs also provides examples of the effects of push and pull factors on gang members. Gangs serve to fulfill functional needs by providing

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[11] Tore Bjorgo, "Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, no. 627 (June 2002), 11–13.

[12] Bjorgo, "Exit Neo-Nazism," 13–15.

their members with identity, community, protection, and excitement.[13] Studies have found that the more the gang was stigmatized in the local community, the more difficult it was for gang members to re-integrate into a normal life.[14] James Vigil observed that the process of leaving a gang was not dissimilar to joining, in that it involved a gradual process of increased commitments. However, he found leaving to be more difficult than joining as this required separating from one's closest friends. Because of this support and friendship, he argues that a member does not leave until this social network is adequately replaced.[15]

4. Collective Disengagement

As previously mentioned, disengagement from a violent organization may be an individual, or a collective process.[16] Martha Crenshaw observes the process in which a terrorist organization weakens may be determined by internal forces, as well as by external policies and actors.[17] Audrey Cronin cites seven explanations for the ending or decline of a terrorist group. These include: "1) the capture or killing of the leader, 2) the failure to transition to the next generation, 3) achievement of the group's aims, 4) transition to a legitimate political process, 5) undermining of popular support, 6) repression, and 7) transitioning from terrorism to other forms of violence."[18] As evidenced by these explanations, a terrorist group may destruct regardless of whether or not action is taken against them.

The process of collective disengagement is often used as a strategy to catalyze the demise of terrorist groups. For example, al-Gama'a al-Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) both engaged in various forms of violence and terrorism in the name of

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[13] Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*, New York: Free Press, 1955.

[14] William J. Chambliss, "The Saints and the Roughnecks," *Society* (November/December 1973).

[15] James D. Vigil, "Group Processes and Street Identity: Adolescent Chicano Gang Members," *Ethos* 16, no. 4 (1988): 421–445.

[16] Horgan, "Deradicalization or Disengagement," 5.

[17] Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Ends," *United States Institute of Peace* (May 25, 1999), 2–4.

[18] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Terrorist Campaigns End," In *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement*, edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, 49–65, New York: Routledge, 2009, 55.

radical Islamism beginning in the 1970s. However, in 1997, the leadership of both organizations declared an end to combat operations. That marked the beginning of a process in which al-Gama'a al-Islamiya and EIJ renounced their violent beliefs and adopted a new system of thought that abandoned all violence.[19] They did so with a theoretical model based in Islam and jurisprudence. This marked a move across the Islamist spectrum to peaceful sociopolitical movements that no longer condemned the faith of fellow Muslims. Subsequently, they focused on the realignment of social, political, and economic affairs in accordance with the teachings of Islam.[20]

In his study of the events in Egypt, Diaa Rashwan cited several factors that led to al-Gama'a al-Islamiya's leadership's decision to cease combat operations and revise their system of thought. Among these was what the leadership referred to as a 'military defeat.' The state's security policy inflicted significant losses on the organization in the way of arrests, armed clashes, prison and death sentences, as well harsh treatment in detention facilities and prisons. Both leadership and general membership were significantly impacted. In spite of past conflict and in recognition of the demonstrated sincerity of al-Gama'a al-Islamiya's desire to review its thoughts and stances, the Egyptian security establishment facilitated meetings between the group's free leaders and those within the prison system.[21] Despite this allowance, the group still faced internal strife during the revision process as its rank and file members, many of whom had spent years in prisons, questioned the shift away from violence. This necessitated a lengthy period of dialogue to convince them to accept the new system of thought.[22] Ultimately, al-Gama'a al-Islamiya's cohesive organizational structure enabled it to overcome these challenges and implement its revised perspective that called for an end to violence.[23] EIJ, on the other hand, lacked this centralized framework and consequently received more

[19] Diaa Rashwan, "The Renunciation of Violence by Egyptian Jihadi Organizations," In *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement*, edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, New York: Routledge, 2009, 113, 121.

[20] Rashwan, "Renunciation of Violence," 121.

[21] Rashwan, "Renunciation of Violence," 123–24.

[22] Rashwan, "Renunciation of Violence," 129.

[23] While Gama'a al-Islamiya participates in peaceful, legal activities, some of its former members have united with Al Qaeda and continue to participate in violence on its behalf.

focused security attention during its process of ideological reconsideration.[24] Although EIJ followed a revisionist process through 2007, it failed in its attempt to transition from violent extremism to centrist beliefs. A lack of coherent leadership structure and a history marked by organizational schisms contributed to this failure at revision and ultimately ended with the organization merging with Al-Qaeda.

The collective disengagement of radical Islamists in Algeria offers another example of a pragmatic process where the groups did not revise their ideologies in justifying their decision to abandon their armed wing.[25] Omar Ashour's examination of Algeria's disengagement program aimed at the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)—the armed wing of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)—found that state repression, inducements, social interaction, and organizational leadership were critical factors that contributed to the process.[26] While both organizations were subject to similar treatment, leadership and interaction with other organizations proved to be the critical factors for different levels of disengagement within AIS and GIA.

The Algerian state imposed intensely repressive measures against radical Islamists after the government cancelled national elections in 1992. In the first five years of the conflict that ensued, the government claimed responsibility for over 10,000 'disappeared persons', and imprisonment of 17,000 armed Islamists between 1992 and 1997.[27] In an effort to address these past grievances and make the disengagement process

[24] Rashwan, "Renunciation of Violence," 125.

[25] Omar Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures," *The Middle East Institute Policy Brief*, no. 21 (November 2008), 1.

[26] Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization," 5.

[27] Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization," 6.

more attractive, the Algerian government offered selective incentives.[28] These included government compliance with AIS's demand to release all its prisoners, as well as FIS leadership and affiliates. It also provided employment and compensation to families who had been victimized by the government during the conflict.[29]

Social interaction by the Algerian Islamist groups also proved to be a relevant factor. The leadership of the AIS was influenced positively by non-Islamist and other Islamist organizations, namely Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, a group that had previously renounced violence.[30] The GIA, on the other hand, had sparse interaction with other organizations, primarily because of its excessive violence. Additionally, Ashour found the strength of leadership to be crucial. The AIS had a cohesive, charismatic leadership that proved willing to disengage. It was able to effectively dismantle its armed wing, as well as influence smaller armed affiliates to likewise disarm. Conversely, the GIA did not have this type of leadership.[31]

E. METHODOLOGY

As can be inferred from the paragraphs above, it is not possible to identify one definitive strategy as facilitating a successful disengagement program. Disengagement is a contextual activity dependent upon social, political, and economic factors. Success or failure may be more a function of environmental and organizational variables than it is a particular set of inducements. Therefore, determining precise causal relationships with an insurgency campaign's internal and external environment is a highly subjective activity, and determining correlation is more realistic. Developing a methodology to effectively

[28] The Algerian regime sought to enhance the deradicalization process of militants by addressing several major issues with the use of selective inducements. These included political prisoners, social reintegration, and the role of the military's role in politics. It began with the release of FIS detainees, leaders, and other affiliates, including high-profile prisoners like the GIA's founder, 'Abd al-Haqq Layada, Additionally, President Bouteflika apologized and provided various forms of compensation to former guerrillas and their families for discrimination against them by the regime and its associates. The regime also provided personal arms to former AIS commanders for protection against potential threats. Finally, in an ostensible effort to depoliticize the army, 800 senior officers—to include the Commander of Land forces—were removed from their positions and provided pensions. – *from* Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization," 9–10.

[29] Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization," 9.

[30] Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization," 8.

[31] Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization," 2.

gauge the scope and utility of past disengagement programs is also hindered by the quantity and type of data available, particularly that which might indicate social psychological processes and motivations of those that participated. That said, studying the circumstances in which individual disengagement is most likely to help facilitate the demise of insurgency campaigns is a worthwhile venture. The steps below describe the methodology that will be used to test this paper's hypotheses.

Step 1. *Define the Problem.*

What membership levels should disengagement strategies target in order to most effectively reduce an insurgency campaign's capacity to conduct violence?

Step 2. *Identify and Operationalize the Variables.*

The Independent Variable in this thesis is the *membership level targeted by the disengagement program*. For the purposes of this paper, the following typology will be used to delineate insurgency membership levels. Those with operational roles will be considered low-level members. Low-level individuals with operational roles are responsible for physically executing violent attacks. These roles require relatively few skills and little training, yet assume the greatest level of risk and exposure to capture. Furthermore, these individuals are relatively junior in the organization. Those in supporting roles will be considered mid-level members. Individuals with these roles perform an ancillary purpose that serves to provide resources that enable leaders and operators to conduct attacks. These individuals include recruiters, resource providers, and financiers, among others. Those in planning and mobilizing roles will be considered high-level members. Individuals occupying these leadership roles serve to guide and coordinate the organization's ideology, purpose, and mission. The categorization of an individual's role will be determined by their self-admitted function in the organization, with the most significant role taking precedence in the event an individual performs multiple functions. If this level of detail is not attainable, it will be determined by the nature of the offense an individual is known to have committed.

The Intervening Variable is the *growth trend of the organization*. This will be measured by the insurgency campaign's violent attacks per year. Specifically, campaigns

will be characterized as being in a state of *growth* or *decline* based on an upward or downward trend of this metric. When the campaign demonstrates an annual increase in its growth trend, it will be considered to be in a state of growth. When the campaign experiences an annual decrease in its growth trend, it will be considered to be in a state of decline. Lastly, since one of the goals of any insurgency is to increase its capacity to conduct violence so that it can eventually defeat the state, this paper will consider campaigns that remain static as failing to make progress toward accomplishing their objective and thus, in a relative state of decline.

The Dependent Variable is the *violent activities of the organization*. This will be measured by the number of insurgent initiated attacks per year. For the purposes of this paper, the size of the attack will not matter. What is relevant is that it is enemy generated activity deemed to reflect the insurgent campaign's capacity to mobilize resources and conduct operations.

Lastly, the notion of *social contagion* among members of networks will be examined to determine if it takes place when individual insurgents disengage from violence. Without access to disengaged persons and knowledge of their social networks, it is impossible to determine the individual and group factors that influenced their decision to leave the insurgency campaigns of which they were members. Therefore, in an effort to appreciate how the phenomenon of leaving violence can spread among an insurgency's members, the patterns of the popularity of disengagement will be analyzed over time. Specifically, it will be measured by a comparative analysis of the percentage growth of disengaged insurgents from one year to the next, with levels of insurgent attacks during that same year.

Step 3. *Collecting the Data.*

Numerous cases exist where disengagement programs were utilized to induce fighters to leave insurgency campaigns. Historical data from these will be examined using the methodology described above in order to facilitate analysis of the relationships between the rank and number of disengaged insurgents, insurgency growth trends, and

insurgent initiated violence. This paper will study the cases of the Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, the amnesty program used during the Malayan Emergency, and the Peace and Reconciliation Commission in Afghanistan.

Step 4. *Determining Causal Relationships.*

This step will attempt to identify well-specified causal relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variable. It will also identify any antecedent conditions and intervening variables that affect the independent variable's interaction with the dependent variable.

Step 5. *Determine Applicability.*

As a final step, the thesis evaluates the applicability of the findings. More specifically, given the findings, how might the U.S. use these findings to employ disengagement strategies under appropriate conditions?

F. THESIS PREVIEW AND ROADMAP

In this thesis, I argue that, in order to achieve the greatest impact in defeating insurgent organizations, appropriate levels of membership should be targeted depending on the relative strength of the insurgency. In an attempt to do so, Chapter II examines literature from the disciplines of social psychology, network theory, and organizational theory. Moving beyond the individual psychological processes of disengagement, it will account for the both the micro and macro level theoretical perspectives in examination of the social and organizational impacts of individuals exiting organizations. Chapter III analyzes the importance of leadership as it relates to influence over an organization's membership. It also examines how leadership is affected by the organization's relative state of growth or decline. Finally, it considers the impact of ideology on an individual's utility function when considering disengaging from violence. Chapter IV proposes a set of principles to inform individual disengagement strategies for insurgency campaigns based on the theoretical foundations outlined in previous chapters. Chapter V consists of case studies of disengagement programs in Vietnam, Malaya, and Afghanistan. Finally, Chapter VI considers policy implications and proposes further research.

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II. SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVES

A. INTRODUCTION

At the individual level, disengagement can occur for a variety of reasons. It might be a state of disillusionment that results when the organization does not meet expectations or when strategic differences arise. In other instances, it may have little to do with the group and its objectives and more to do with a change in personal priorities.[32] In either case, it is an individual decision. Social processes, though, help inform individual psychology. Rarely does an individual make a decision without considering, or being informed by, the attitudes and behavior of those with whom they socialize. The ideas and values obtained from personal and professional relationships help shape an individual's attitudes and behavior and—in this case—the decision to disengage. Social psychological processes comparable to those experienced by the disengaged member will also have repercussions on the thoughts and actions of other members of an organization. Accordingly, the effects of an individual leaving an organization will not end abruptly with only one member's departure.

An assessment of the social psychological processes that occur in social network relations is relevant to disengagement because of its potential to consider the way in which individuals impact the decision-making and behavior of one another. Understanding these processes and their effects on the group prior to, during, and after disengagement promises to provide a more comprehensive appreciation of how an individual's departure impacts an organization and each of its members. To consider the impacts of individual decisions and behavior within a group, the importance of network relationships will be considered first.

[32] John Horgan, "Individual Disengagement, A Psychological Analysis," In *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement,* edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, 17–29, New York: Routledge, 2009, 21–22.

B. SOCIAL NETWORKS

Social network theory provides a framework to relate the relationships of socially connected individuals. A social network is a "finite set or sets of actors and the relation, or relations, defined on them."[33] Nodes represent individual actors, and relationships between actors are depicted by the existence or non-existence of nodal ties.[34] Insurgent and terrorist organizations are like other networks in that they consist of actors linked by professional, friendship, and familial ties. The overall structure of the networks, whether a function of organizational design or the result of social interaction, portrays the connections that exist amongst its members. Multiple networks overlap just as the individual connections and relationships within them frequently overlap.

Ibarra and Andrews portray relationships between actors in the context of two different types of networks. Instrumental, or formal, networks are those that provide an employee with work-related advice and information, as well as the resources, expert knowledge, and "political access" required to function effectively in the organization. Expressive, or informal, networks, on the other hand, are those in which an employee derives friendship ties and social support.[35] This is not to imply that the two are independent or separate; formal networks of organizations tend to inform and overlap with patterns of social relations.[36] Relationships initially form to help the organization function, but often evolve to the point where their influence extends beyond work processes. In the end, informal social networks that develop are likely to mirror the

[33] Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 20.

[34] Daniel J. Brass, J. Galaskiewicz, H. R. Greve, and W. Tsai, "Taking Stock of Networks and Organizations: A Multilevel Perspective," *Academy of Management Journal* 47 (2004): 795.

[35] Herminia Ibarra, "Personal Networks of Women and Minorities in Management: A Conceptual Framework," *Academy of Management Review* 18, no. 1 (1993): 56–87.

[36] Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 91, no. 3 (1985): 481–510.

formal network,[37] but are not necessarily constrained by it. The formal network simply presents opportunities for interaction and the individual actor chooses with whom to form a social relationship.[38]

The expressive networks that develop out of these relationships are as important to the organization as its instrumental networks. Similar individuals in expressive networks develop relationships that possess high levels of trust and intimacy between one another. Instrumental networks, on the other hand, consist of weaker ties that link more diverse individuals.[39] Leon Festinger's Social Comparison Theory helps explain the significance of this. Individuals decide who to have relationships with and learn about themselves by way of comparison with others. When they do so, they prefer to compare their ideas and abilities and also interact with those they view as being similar to themselves; this could be on the basis of ethnicity, age, or similar structural roles in an organization. This tendency, referred to as homophily, has significant effects on relationships, as well as thoughts and behavior. [40]

The thoughts and ideas relationships engender affect individual decisions and behavior, and—in the case of an organization—the group-at-large.[41] Interacting with similar others is believed to ease communication and increase familiarity, which brings about trust and reciprocity.[42] Shared relationships in a network that exhibit these characteristics frequently allow for increased trust and interaction norms between groups and individuals. Since investments, risks, and performance all entail shared costs and benefits among a group's members,[43] individuals in a group will prefer to interact with others with whom they have something in common. An individual's expressive network

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[37] Brass et al., "Taking Stock," 795–819.

[38] W. A. Mason, F. R. Conrey, and E. R. Smith, "Situating Social Influence Processes: Dynamic, Multidirectional Flows of Influence within Social Networks," Personality and Social Psychology Review: An Official Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc 11, no. 3 (2007): 286.

[39] Ibarra, "Personal Networks," 56–87.

[40] Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Social Comparison Processes,* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954.

[41] Mason et al., "Situating Social Influence," 286.

[42] Brass et al., "Taking Stock," 796.

[43] Andrea Larson, "Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Settings: A Study of the Governance of Exchange Relationships," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (1992): 87–89.

also affects their loyalty and commitment to the organization.[44] Networked individuals are likely to be happier, more committed, and less likely to leave their organization.[45] Loyalty among members has been found to be more meaningful to an individual than dedication to "an amorphous, distant…corporate entity."[46] In summary, the extent to which relationships and expressive networks are strong, they are beneficial for individuals, as well as the organization.

The density of network ties is also relevant for the organization. Feeley, Hwang, and Barnett argue that the number of friendship ties is more significant than the closeness of ties for retaining organizational membership. The greater number of these ties provides multiple support lines through which individuals can seek to reduce stress. They propose the idea that friends' being "in it together" enables groups to persevere through the worst of jobs and circumstances.[47] Ultimately, it is the interests of the organization to foster and maintain relationships to promote stability within the organization.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL TURNOVER AND EMBEDDEDNESS

When an individual exits any network, relationship ties are altered and sometimes severed. The social psychological processes that ensue have effects on the behavior of those that remain in the organization. In business, the process in which an actor exits an organization is referred to as turnover. It is defined as a time specific event that involves

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[44] Bruce Buchanan, "Building Organizational Commitment: The Socialization of Managers in Work Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1974): 533–546.

[45] B. Wellman and K. Frank, 2001, "Network Capital in a Multi-level World: Getting Support from Personal Communities," In *Social Capital: Theory and Research*, edited by Nan Lin, Karen S. Cook, and Ronald S. Burt, New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine Transaction, 2005.

[46] D. C. Feldman, 2000, "From the Me Decade to the Flee Decade," In *Relational Wealth: The Advantages of Stability in a Changing Economy*, edited by C. R. Leana and D. M. Rousseau, 169–182, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 179.

[47] T. H. Feeley, J. Hwang, and G. Barnett, "Predicting Employee Turnover from Friendship Networks," *Journal of Applied Communication Research* 36, no. 1 (2008): 66–70.

physical separation from a group.[48] Individual turnover comes about for a variety of reasons that include psychological, or micro, as well as organizational, or macro, conditions.[49]

Embeddedness is a network measure that explains the variety of factors that constrain an individual's decision and what people stand to lose by leaving their jobs.[50] Mitchell et al refer to three dimensions of embeddedness: links, fit, and sacrifice. Links are the formal and informal ties, and entail an individual's social, psychological, and financial web. The greater the number of links, the more an individual is bound to other individuals, groups, or the organization, and leaving potentially severs or alters those relationships. Fit represents the degree to which an individual perceives themselves as being an appropriate fit for their job and work environment, as well as having values and goals that align with those of the organization and other individuals within the organization. Most importantly, sacrifice consists of what an individual loses when leaving an organization. These include extrinsic benefits, or more personal losses of psychological benefits and relationships.[51] Understandably, the more an individual is required to give up in leaving an organization, the more difficult the process will be.[52]

When the decision to leave is made, it can lead to serious disruptive effects for the organization and its members. This is particularly relevant when the losses are significant in importance or number.[53] Outcomes will be even more profound if the individual is a member of a cohesive work group or holds particularly exceptional social status within

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[48] William H. Mobley, "Some Unanswered Questions in Turnover and Withdrawal Research," Academy of Management Review 7, no. 1 (1982): 111.

[49] Will Felps, Terence R. Mitchell, David R. Hekman, Thomas W. Lee, Brooks C. Holtom, and Wendy S. Harman, "Turnover Contagion: How Coworkers' Job Embeddedness and Job Search Behaviors Influence Quitting," *Academy of Management Journal*, 52, no. 3 (2009): 545.

[50] Terence R. Mitchell, Brooks C. Holtom, Thomas W. Lee, Chris J. Sablynski, and Miriam Erez, "Why People Stay: Using Job Embeddedness to Predict Voluntary Turnover," *Academy of Management Journal* 44, no. 6 (2001): 1104.

[51] Mitchell et al., "Why People Stay," 1104–1105.

[52] Jason D. Shaw, John E. Delery, G. Douglas Jenkins, and Nina Gupta, "An Organization-Level Analysis of Voluntary and Involuntary Turnover," *Academy of Management Journal* 41, no. 5 (1998): 511–525.

[53] Barry M. Staw, "The Consequences of Turnover," *Journal of Occupational Behavior* 1, no. 4 (1980): 256.

the organization.[54] That said, effects of turnover are not consistent for all individuals across the organization nor are they random. For a given individual or organization, the impacts on those who remain will increase with the number of individuals who leave, as well as the strength and distance of the network ties they had, and possibly continue to have, with the stayers.[55] The closer individuals perceive themselves to those who departed the organization, the more likely they are to leave.[56]

As indicated, the response elicited in individuals remaining in an organization after someone leaves is likely to depend on the individual stayer's relationship to the leaver. While members of an individual's instrumental network on whom work routines depend, will potentially have negative repercussions on performance, they are more easily replaced.[57] The loss of a friend is different in that it takes with it a source of social support.[58] This consequence has longer-term effects for the individual as new friendship ties take a significant amount of time to develop.

D. IMPACT OF LOST NETWORK TIES

In addition to the stayer's relationship to the leaver, the conditions of the turnover will represent real and perceived threats and opportunities for the individual remaining, as well as the organization.[59] Individuals leaving an organization can undermine the attitude of those that remain in the organization who might view their future as less desirable and begin to question their reason for staying as a result. Stayers will also be made aware of the experience of the leavers, be it positive or negative. In this way, the

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[54] R. M. Steers and R. T. Mowday, 1980, "Employee Turnover and Post-Decision Accommodation Processes," In *Research in Organizational Behavior*, edited by L. L. Cummings, and B. M. Staw, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT.

[55] David Krackhardt and Lyman W. Porter, "When Friends Leave: A Structural Analysis of the Relationship between Turnover and Stayers' Attitudes," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 30, no. 2 (1985), 246–248.

[56] Feeley et al., "Predicting Employee Turnover," 70.

[57] Priti Pradhan Shah, "Network Destruction: The Structural Implications of Downsizing," *Academy of Management Journal* 43, no. 1 (2000): 106–108.

[58] Shah, "Network Destruction," 102.

[59] Shah, "Network Destruction," 108–9.

turnover of an individual or group of individuals may precipitate further turnover by eroding stayers' attitudes, as well as informing them of the potential threats and opportunities that accompany leaving.[60]

Specifically, the perceived reason for departure will have an impact on the reaction to an individual's leaving. An individual leaving will not have as great of an impact when it is for a non-organizational reason that is more personal in nature, such as a sick family member. In the opposite case, leaving behavior will adversely affect the morale of those members remaining to the degree it has to do with the organization, such as a negative sentiment toward the ideals or objectives of the organization.[61]

Heider's balance theory of friendship offers a perspective for consideration of the effects of turnover on the individuals who remain in the organization. He described a triangle of relationships between an individual, another person, and an object of common interest.[62] In the context of organizational turnover, this translates to the stayer, the friend who is the leaver, and the organization. If turnover is attributed to an exogenous reason beyond the organization's or the individual's control, sympathies do not change and the triangle is stable. If, however, leaving is attributed to the dissatisfaction with the organization, the stayer is likely to balance the triangle by becoming more dissatisfied with the organization.[63]

E. SOCIAL CONTAGION EFFECTS

When individuals become dissatisfied, it can lead to additional turnover. An activity known as Social Influence Processing, describes the ways in which other people affect and help shape other individuals' feelings, beliefs, and behavior.[64] It can shape the behavior of individuals, as well as entire groups. Introduced earlier, the notion of social comparison can perpetuate itself through the process of social influence whereby

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[60] Staw, "Consequences of Turnover," 257.

[61] Steers and Mowday, "Employee Turnover."

[62] Fritz Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations,* New York: Wiley, 1958.

[63] Krackhardt and Porter, "When Friends Leave," 244–246.

[64] Mason et al., "Situating Social Influence," 279.

individuals have a tendency to become more similar when they interact. They develop and adapt their attitudes and beliefs through a process of social interaction in which they compare their own opinions with those of others.[65] Comparison with another is even more likely to be made in unique, risky, or ambiguous situations.[66] When considering leaving, individuals often experience a high level of uncertainty and risk.[67] In an effort to cope with these feelings, they look to fellow employees for additional information, particularly when no non-social means of comparison exists.[68]

In a group, social influence and popular opinion tend to reinforce success or failure in a virtuous or vicious cycle.[69] Ideas or events are made to appear much better, or worse, as they gain momentum. Owing to these phenomena, personnel often turnover in clusters; one person's departure induces a snowball effect. This is known as turnover contagion, and occurs when an employee searches for a job or leaves an organization, thus affecting the leaving behavior of others through social contagion. Krackhardt and Porter found this contagion effect spread to clusters that were usually related to persons' roles in the organization. Specifically, these roles were derived from their expressive network. Individuals who see themselves in a similar position as those who leave attempt to make sense of pertinent information concerning their job, as well as relevant alternatives outside the organization. The degree of success experienced by those that leave helps reduce ambiguity and inform the viability making the same decision.[70] To the extent that exit is positive for the leavers, it causes the similar others to consider leaving as well.[71]

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[65] B. H. Erickson, 1988, "The Relational Basis of Attitudes," In *Social structures: A Network Approach,* edited by B. Wellman and S. D. Berkowitz, 99–121, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

[66] Festinger, *Theory of Social Comparison*.

[67] Robert P. Steel, "Turnover Theory at the Empirical Interface: Problems of Fit and Function," *Academy of Management Review* 27, no. 3 (2002): 346–360.

[68] Festinger, *Theory of Social Comparison*.

[69] Matthew J. Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts, "Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market," *Science* 311, no. 5762 (2006): 854.

[70] Felps et al., "Turnover Contagion," 546–547.

[71] David Krackhardt and Lyman W. Porter, 1986, "The Snowball Effect: Turnover in Embedded Communication Networks," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 71: 50–55.

Legitimate opportunities elsewhere have the potential to develop into norms in expressive networks and have cumulative effects on attitudes, behaviors, and turnover in general.[72] Felps et al found an individual's tendency to leave is related to the number of others that leave the organization. A relatively large enough number might also serve to increase the salience of an individual's decision to leave for personal morale and well-being.[73] As individuals make the decision to leave, the effects on the organization will have to do with the number and importance of those that depart.[74]

F. EFFECTS OF TURNOVER ON THE ORGANIZATION

As individuals leave an organization and do so based largely on connections in their expressive networks, the corresponding missing links in the instrumental network constrain the organization by limiting the opportunities individuals have to communicate information and share resources. When individuals in a network no longer have common relationships to connect each other, it is known as a structural hole. Holes in the instrumental network can emerge when persons who maintain central ties depart an organization and are not replaced with someone who can efficiently perform the same function.[75] That said, structural holes have implications beyond the instrumental network.

Structural holes typically represent two types of losses: social and human capital. Social ties can be broken, giving stayers fewer people with whom to interact, thus feeling isolated; this is referred to as a loss of social capital. [76] The extent to which the loss of members of an organization has significant negative repercussions on the organization's social fabric is related to the social capital held by departing individuals, as well as their

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[72] M. A. Abelson, 1993, "Turnover Cultures," In Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management, edited by G. Ferris and G. Rowland, vol. 11: 339–376, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

[73] Felps et al., "Turnover Contagion," 547–548.

[74] Peyton Young describes how economic and social institutions evolve at the macro level based on interaction, learning, and individual choices in an adaptive environment in: H. Peyton Young, *Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.

[75] Alex M. Susskind, Vernon D. Miller, and J. David Johnson, "Downsizing and Structural Holes: Their Impact on Layoff Survivors' Perceptions of Organizational Chaos and Openness to Change," Communication Research 25, no. 1 (1998): 31, 38.

[76] Susskind et al., "Downsizing and Structural Holes," 32.

professional and personal relationships with remaining members of the organization. According to Leana and Van Buren, social capital is "a resource reflecting the character of social relations within the organization, realized through members' levels of collective goal orientation and shared trust."[77] Specifically, trust is a key component of social capital. It helps lower transaction costs[78] since norms of exchange are strengthened and the risk of disingenuous behavior is mitigated.[79] When lost, it has exponential effects that are detrimental to performance. Likewise, the organization suffers disproportionate losses when individuals who hold and are particularly adept at creating social capital leave the organization.[80] Similar to relationships in expressive networks and unlike human capital, it is a resource that cannot be easily replaced when lost.[81]

On the other hand, the loss of human capital means specialized skills are no longer available to the organization. When individuals depart and take with them an efficient knowledge, skill, or process, the organization is left with a reduced capacity to generate outcomes.[82] Human capital theory suggests that an organization's function relies on valuable, firm specific human capital.[83] Since turnover undermines human capital, it further diminishes productivity.[84] The adverse effects increase when there is a greater degree of specialization that cannot be readily replaced.[85] Similarly, there is typically a positive relationship between the departed member's stature in the hierarchy or degree of

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[77] Carrie R. Leana and Harry J. van Buren, "Organizational Social Capital and Employment Practices," *Academy of Management Review* 24, no. 3 (1999): 540.

[78] Janine Nahapiet and Sumantra Ghoshal, "Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage," *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 2 (1998): 242–266.

[79] K. G. Provan, "Embeddedness, Interdependence, and Opportunities in Organizational Supplier-Buyer Networks," *Journal of Management-Lubbock then College Station Texas* 19, no. 4 (1993): 841.

[80] Gregory G. Dess and Jason D. Shaw, "Voluntary Turnover, Social Capital, and Organizational Performance," Academy of Management Review 26, no. 3 (2001): 451.

[81] Danny Miller and Jamal Shamsie, "The Resource-Based View of the Firm in Two Environments: The Hollywood Film Studios from 1936 to 1965," *Academy of Management Journal* 39, no. 3 (1996): 519–543.

[82] Susskind et al., "Downsizing and Structural Holes," 32.

[83] M. H. Strober, "Human Capital Theory: Implications for HR Managers," Industrial Relations, no. 29 (1990): 214–239.

[84] Dess and Shaw, "Voluntary Turnover," 447.

[85] Staw, "Consequences of Turnover," 256.

specialization in the network, and the network disruption.[86] The most adverse consequences for performance result from the replacement of high-level employees.[87] Staw states:

> The chief moderator of whether turnover causes an operational disruption is the centrality of the particular role to the organization's functioning. In general, the higher the level of the position to be filled the greater the potential for disruption.[88]

Nodes with noteworthy centrality in an organization might include: 1) an individual or group whose removal would change the network greatly;[89] 2) an individual or group who can spread information rapidly, such as gossips or early adopters;[90] or 3) an individual or group that possesses a greater level of power and can produce trouble, or facilitate dissidents.[91] Knowing the characteristics of those who occupy central locations is essential to understanding the organization and which individuals might produce the most disruptive and adverse consequences for the organization when removed.

As central actors are removed and instrumental and expressive networks are altered, the remaining members of the organization will likely perceive chaos and uncertainty. Susskind et al found that individuals perceived the organization's position to be improving as structural holes were filled. Nonetheless, perceptions of chaos can still be exacerbated by the modification of network relationships. As the organization adapts, many members of the organization will be made to deal with new co-workers, superiors and subordinates, work roles, and work location.[92]

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[86] Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

[87] C. O. Trevor, B. Gerhart and J. W. Boudreau, "Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance: Curvilinearity and the Moderating Influences of Salary Growth and Promotions," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 82, no. 1 (1997): 44–61.

[88] Staw, "Consequences of Turnover," 256.

[89] Phillip Bonacich, "Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures," *American Journal of Sociology* 92, no. 5 (1987): 1170–1182.

[90] Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, *Communication of Innovations: A Cross-Cultural Approach,* New York: Free Press, 1971.

[91] Bonacich, "Power and Centrality."

[92] Susskind et al., "Downsizing and Structural Holes," 58, 59, 42.

G. POSITIVE OUTCOMES

The alteration of relationships and networks does not impact all employees in the same way and can also have impacts that are positive and not necessarily aligned with those described above. While some may lose relationships and access to information, others may improve their position and gain from the original network deficiency. The departure of a person at a leadership position at the top of the networked hierarchy may lead to a series of promotions in the organization, implying minimal impact since the only position requiring replacement and training is that of the lowest or least specialized position within the organization. Change of personnel in positions of leadership and centrality, can also lead to the positive effect of organizational adaptation.[93] This can occur by way of persons moving into positions of greater authority where they are able to implement ideas, or it may simply serve to signal a need for reorientation by the organization.

Conflict is one of the sufficient conditions for an individual leaving an organization. Although organizations tend to attempt to mediate or work through conflict situations, many conflicts are difficult to resolve since they involve a fundamental difference in values or ideology. Whether the source of conflict is task oriented or personal, the departure of one of the conflicting parties can actually reduce or resolve conflict in the organization.[94] Staw remarks, "In political and religious organizations, for example, conflict among the organization's membership is likely to persist and detract from collective solidarity and purpose. Conflict in these organizations is usually resolved only by the departure of a minority, perhaps setting up its own autonomous organization or splinter group."[95] Similarly, the departure of unpopular individuals, particularly those in positions of leadership or influence, can lead to an overall increase of morale.[96]

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[93] Staw, “Consequences of Turnover,” 256, 263.

[94] Staw, “Consequences of Turnover,” 262.

[95] Staw, “Consequences of Turnover,” 262.

[96] Staw, “Consequences of Turnover,” 263.

III. WHY LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY MATTER

A. INTRODUCTION

As the preceding discussion regarding social networks established, positions within an organization are not equal in terms of ties and importance. In particular, leaders play important roles in organizations and are more closely identified with an organization and more central in its social network. Because of this, their ability to influence those under their charge will be affected by the organization's overall success. This aspect of leadership is particularly relevant to the study of how the effects on an organization will differ based on who the individual is that decides to disengage.

Because of the relationship between leadership and performance, there are certain stages in the organization's lifecycle during which leaders are more important and have relatively greater influence than others. These are times during which targeting disengagement at organizational leadership is likely to be a more beneficial strategy. Drawing from the concepts of social comparison and social influence previously introduced, this chapter will describe how individuals become leaders within an organization and go on to influence its members. It will then explain the process in which an organization's outcomes are frequently attributed to its leaders regardless of the leadership's actual personal accountability. Lastly, it will consider the impacts of social processes on behavior and decision-making in light of ideological influence.

B. LEADERSHIP

1. Importance of Leadership

Most importantly, organizational leadership helps give meaning to an organization's activities and what it believes. It defines the institutionalized values that guide the behavior of members at all levels.[97] Bernard Bass offers the following explanation of leadership: "Leadership is an interaction between two or more members of

[97] Joel M. Podolny, Rakesh Khurana, and Marya Hill-Popper, 2010, "Revisiting the Meaning of Leadership," In *Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice: An HBS Centennial Colloquium on Advancing Leadership* edited by Nitin Nohria and Rakesh Khurana, 65–105, Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 65.

a group that often involves structuring or restructuring of the situation and the perceptions and expectations of the members."[98] Similarly, Chester Barnard asserts that the leadership must create in its membership a universal awareness and belief in the organization's purpose. The organization's ability to endure is contingent on leadership's ability to establish a common sense of the purpose and a determined and principled effort to achieve it.[99] This necessitates the shaping of goal compatibility between the leader and the led if it is not already present in the mind of the follower. This is paramount since goal alignment allows the follower to effectively submit to the influence of a leader.[100] In the context of an insurgency campaign, goal alignment is expected to occur throughout the organization's networked hierarchy to the extent that individual insurgents are volunteer members and have not been coerced into joining.

Through the lens of organization behavior, there is little consensus concerning what good leadership entails and how it functions to achieve a desired effect[101]—if it is able to do so at all since even when a leader is able to exercise a significant amount of control over an organization's activities, many environmental factors remain out of the leader's control.[102] Nonetheless, leadership can impact the organization with its ability to affect the psychosocial processes of its members. This implies that an assessment of leadership's importance must account for the ability to impart purpose and meaning into

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[98] Bernard M. Bass and Ralph Melvin Stogdill, *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*, New York: The Free Press, 1990.

[99] Chester Irving Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

[100] T. A. Kochan, S. M. Schmidt, and T. A. DeCotiis, "Superior-Subordinate Relations: Leadership and Headship," Human Relations, Vol. 28 (1975), 279–294.

[101] Mary Ann Glynn and Rich DeJordy, 2010, "Leadership through an Organization Behavior Lens: A Look at the Last Half-century of Research," In *Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice: An HBS Centennial Colloquium on Advancing Leadership*, edited by Nitin Nohria and Rakesh Khurana, 119–157, Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 119.

[102] Jeffrey Pfeffer, "The Ambiguity of Leadership," *The Academy of Management Review* 2, no. 1 (January 1977): 107.

the overall organizational experience.[103] It must have the ability to influence how individuals perceive the implications and interpretations of certain events in the organization.[104]

2. Authority, Power, and Influence

Generally, individuals holding high-ranking positions are viewed to be in possession of institutionalized power.[105] Charles Fombrun asserts that influence is attributed to formal position, rank, and status more than it is to network location.[106] That being said, others contend the contrary is true—power is ultimately constrained by an individual's location and personal connections in the organizational network. Rosabeth Kanter was one who argued that power is determined by the position, not the person,[107] and Morgan McCall pointed to the significance of "being in the right place."[108] The most significant members in a network are usually located in strategic positions[109] that provide them with relatively greater degrees of power and influence.[110] The social network locations that exhibit these traits are those characterized by a measure known as centrality.

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[103] S. Lieberson and J. F. O'Connor, "Leadership and Organizational Performance: A Study of Large Corporations," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 2 (1972): 117–130.

[104] Louis R. Pondy, "Leadership is a Language Game," In *Leadership: Where Else Can We Go?*, edited by M. W. McCall, Jr., and M. M. Lombardo, 87–99, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Richard L. Daft and Karl E. Weick, "Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems," *Academy of Management Review* 9, no. 2 (1984): 284–295.

[105] David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (December, 1962): 350–351.

[106] Charles J. Fombrun, 1983, "Attributions of Power Across a Social Network," Human Relations, 36: 493–508.

[107] R. M. Kanter, "Power Failure in Management Circuits," *Harvard Business Review* 57, no. 4 (1979).

[108] Morgan W. McCall, 1979, "Power, Authority, and Influence," In *Organizational Behavior*, edited by Steven Kerr, 185–206, Columbus, OH: Grid, 189.

[109] Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis.*

[110] Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations*, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.

3. Network Centrality

Introduced in the previous chapter, the measure of an individual's centrality helps situate the notion of leadership in the context of social networks. Central actors are those in a network that tend to have access to, and control, more information and resources because of their alignment with the organization's ideals. This information, along with more influential positions and ties to the network's dominant coalition, allows leaders at all levels to be more powerful.[111] They usually have access to information from the organization's upper level leaders, as well as relevant knowledge they obtain from other network members that they can pass back to higher levels of leadership.[112]

4. Leadership's Social Influence

When an organization selects individuals to serve in formal leadership positions, it is likely to select persons whose ideals and attributes closely reflect those valued by the organization.[113] In addition to their central location in the network, leaders are also able to exercise the greatest degree of influence and persuade other members based on their prototypicality. A prototypical individual is one who is relatively more representative of the organization's behavioral norms and values. Owing to their increased influence and representative traits and behavior, they provide group members with a set of expectations.[114]

Likewise, once selected for a position of leadership, the organization and its members will give their expectations for proper conduct.[115] In fact, the success of a

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[111] Daniel J. Brass, "Being in the Right Place: A Structural Analysis of Individual Influence in an Organization," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (December, 1984): 518–539.

[112] David Krackhardt, "Assessing the Political Landscape: Structure, Cognition, and Power in Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1990): 342–369.

[113] Brass et al., "Taking Stock," 796.

[114] John C. Turner and S. Alexander Haslam, 2001, "Social Identity, Organizations, and Leadership," In *Groups at Work: Theory and Research*, edited by Marlene E. Turner, 25–65, Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 41.

[115] R. L. Kahn, D. M. Wolfe, R. P. Quinn, and J. D. Snoek, *Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity*, New York: Wiley, 1964.

leader is often contingent on her/his ability to fulfill their followers' expected standard.[116] Subordinates, peers, and superiors all pressure an individual to conform to their expectations.[117] Through the process of social influence, perceived similarity among a group or organization's members leads to more similar behavior in terms of shared norms and values. This has the effect of producing consensual expectations among members. The importance of these is reinforced to the extent they are confirmed.

However, when disagreement occurs, doubt arises concerning the validity of certain judgments. Either the group, or each of its individual members, must subsequently resolve this conflict.[118] Since persons in positions of leadership are selected for ideological alignment and perceived to represent ideal values and behavior in an organization, their response will be more valued yet closely scrutinized should it disconfirm member expectations. That being said, there are times when the judgment of leaders may be given relatively more or less credence than others.

5. Attribution Theory

Recognizing what leadership and leaders mean to an organization and its members, it is necessary to consider how the perceptions of leaders and the success of the organization relate to one another. Bobby Calder and Jeffrey Pfeffer contend that leadership is used to explain events and outcomes in organizations in a process of attribution.[119] This is one of the ways in which individuals make sense of the world around them and hope to feel as if they have some control over that world.[120]

Individuals identify certain organizational roles as leadership positions. Doing so helps inform their interpretation of what events mean by attributing responsibility for

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[116] Robert G. Lord and Karen J. Maher, *Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1991.

[117] Pfeffer, "Ambiguity of Leadership," 107.

[118] Turner and Haslam, "Social Identity, Organizations," 40.

[119] Bobby J. Calder, "An Attribution Theory of Leadership," In *New Directions in Organizational Behavior* edited by Barry M. Staw and Gerald R. Salancik, Chicago: St. Clair Press, 1977.

Pfeffer, "Ambiguity of Leadership."

[120] Harold H. Kelley, *Attribution in Social Interaction*, New York: General Learning Press, 1971.

outcomes to those positions and the actions of the individuals occupying them. This provides them with a simpler view of reality; even when causality for a certain event is a result of a complex set of interactions, attributing leadership is straightforward.[121] This tendency is sometimes even more prevalent when actual events do not align with what an individual expects to happen.[122]

The phenomena described above point to what Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich refer to as the *romance of leadership*. They maintain that, "as observers of and participants in organizations, we may have developed highly romanticized, heroic views of leadership—what leaders do, what they are able to accomplish, and the general effects they have on our lives."[123] Leaders come to be viewed as symbols of the organization they represent.[124] A distinct process occurs in the minds of members whereby the degree of organizational success or failure determines how the leaders of an organization are perceived. Individuals assume that effective leadership must be present when they observe an organization performing at a high level, and that the reverse is also true.

In fact, this conception of leadership finds its greatest appeal when outcomes are extreme. When an organization performs either very poorly or very well, individuals show a tendency to explain it in terms of how the leadership is performing.[125] The degree of emphasis placed on leadership is directly related to performance outcomes in either direction. As positive and negative performance outcomes become larger, the extent to which they are attributed to leadership, compared to other possible explanations, also increases.[126] Cameron, Kim, and Whetten discovered that members of organizations in a state of decline show significantly more leader scapegoating, low morale, and loss of

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[121] Pfeffer, "Ambiguity of Leadership," 109.

[122] Edward E. Jones and Keith E. Davis, 1965, "From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception," In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, edited by L. Berkowitz, 2: 219–266, New York: Academic Press.

[123] James R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich, "The Romance of Leadership," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (March 1985): 79.

[124] Henry Mintzberg, *The Nature of Managerial Work*, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, 58, 167.

[125] Meindl et al., "Romance of Leadership," 80–81.

[126] Meindl et al., "Romance of Leadership," 88–92.

leader credibility than in states of growth.[127] That being said, leaders are not simply a target of blame or altogether vulnerable just because an organization is not performing as it had previously.

6. Leadership in Crisis

Arguably, for the best leader, it is at such a time that it is most vital for them to symbolize the organization's resiliency and give meaning and focus for the organization's future. During times of crisis when the viability of an organization is threatened, its members desire strong leadership and a well-defined vision for an improved future. They will submit to the influence of a leader who is able to display confidence and provide a vision that not only confers understanding of the present, but reassures them of a promising future.[128] Most members of an organization, particularly at lower levels, are not in a position to appraise potential courses and outcomes when adversity is encountered,[129] nor do they expect their lower level leaders to convey an overarching vision.[130] Instead, they look for a leader whose character, strength, and skill provide promise for future resurgence.[131] Frequently, these qualities are found in charismatic leaders. This type of leader often plays an important role in successful insurgency campaigns, as well as other anti-social movements. According to Edward Shils, a leader of this sort is perceived to possess a charismatic quality that,

> …lies in what is thought to be his connection with some very central feature of man's existence and the cosmos in which he lives. The

[127] Kim S. Cameron, Myung U. Kim, and David A. Whetten, "Organizational Effects of Decline and Turbulence," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (June 1987): 234.

[128] Boas Shamir and Jane M. Howell, "Organizational and Contextual Influences on the Emergence and Effectiveness of Charismatic Leadership," *The Leadership Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (0, 1999): 260.

[129] Daniel Katz and Robert Louis Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations: 2nd Ed*, New York: Wiley, 1978.

[130] A. I. Kraut, P. R. Pedigo, D. D. McKenna, and M. D. Dunnette, "The Role of the Manager: What's Really Important in Different Management Jobs," *The Academy of Management Executive*, 19, no. 4 (2005): 122–129.

[131] Katz and Kahn, *Social Psychology of Organizations.*

> centrality is constituted by its formative power in initiating, creating, governing, transforming, maintaining, or destroying what is vital in man's life.[132]

Charismatic leadership can also be defined in terms of its impact on members of an organization. It results in 1) making the followers' self-esteem dependent on the mission given by the leader, 2) the followers' internalization of—and personal or moral commitment to—the values and goals as defined by the leader, 3) and the follower's placement of the organization above self-interests. Finally, a charismatic leader often seeks to fulfill the vision and promise of organizations that emerge from an ideology, the impact of which will be considered later. [133]

C. GROWTH AND DECLINE

An insurgent leader's ability to influence fighters seemingly benefits from the insurgency's growth and success, but is arguably most vital to the insurgency's survival when it is declining, and during times when it is most challenged or experiencing crisis. Given the significance of leadership attribution, as well as the extent to which growth has an impact on an organization's ability to achieve its objectives, attention must be given to the various explanations and states of organizational growth. Organizations grow for a variety of reasons. The literature offers three general explanations.[134] The first reason for growth is as a result of increased demand for that which the organization produces—this helps secure the future viability of the organization. Second, growth is sought as it facilitates increased internal management. The increased resources that accompany growth more easily enable the organization to obtain commitment to its goals and

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[132] Edward Shils, *The Constitution of Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 122.

[133] R. J. House and B. Shamir, 1993, "Toward the Integration of Transformational, Charismatic, and Visionary Theories," In *Leadership Theory and Research: Perspectives and Directions*, edited by M. M. Chemers and R. Ayman, 81–107, San Diego: Academic Press, 86.

[134] J. Child and A. Kieser, 1981, "Development of Organizations over Time," In *Handbook of Organizational Design*, edited by P. C. Nystrom and W. H. Starbuck, New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

priorities from various other persons and groups.[135] The third explanation offers that organizations seek growth to become more secure in light of an uncertain environment and external factors of control.[136]

The opposite trend, organizational decline, is characterized by a decrease in an organization's resource base over time. The literature on organizational decline consistently indicates that it is marked by a variety of events that undermine organizational effectiveness and lower member satisfaction and dedication.[137] Additionally, the dysfunctional characteristics of decline inherently involve inadequate resources and pressures to make cuts. As a result, persons and groups within the organization are left with a smaller resource base over which to contend, a circumstance that frequently precipitates interpersonal and inter-unit conflict as they seek to protect their own interests.[138] Collectively, these effects serve to diminish morale in the organization.[139]

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[135] Gerald R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer. *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*, New York: Harper and Row, 1978.

[136] Child and Kieser, "Development of Organizations," 32.

[137] Cameron et al., "Organizational Effects of Decline," 224–225.

[138] Charles H. Levine, "Organizational Decline and Cutback Management," *Public Administration Review* 38, no. 4 (1978): 316–325.

Charles H. Levine, "More on Cutback Management: Hard Questions for Hard Times," *Public Administration Review* 39, no. 2 (1979): 179–183.

David A. Whetten, "Organizational Decline: A Neglected Topic in Organizational Science," *The Academy of Management Review* 5, no. 4 (October 1980): 577–588.

Charles F. Hermann, *Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations*, Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center, 1963.

[139] Barry Bozeman and E. Allen Slusher, "Scarcity and Environmental Stress in Public Organizations: A Conjectural Essay," *Administration and Society* 11, no. 3 (1979): 335–355.

Charles H. Levine, Irene Rubin, and George G. Wolohojian, *The Politics of Retrenchment: How Local Governments Manage Fiscal Stress*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981.

William H. Starbuck, Arent Greve, and Bo Hedberg, *Responding to Crises*, Stockholm: Arbetslivscentrum, 1979.

D. IDEOLOGY

1. Importance of Ideology

One of the most important factors for an insurgency campaign is the presence and shared strength of belief in an ideology by its leaders and members. Ideology can have varying degrees of importance and influence, depending on the organization and its goals. The extent to which ideological matters impact the importance of organizational leadership, and the way in which the strength of the membership's belief in an ideology affects disengagement, are the final elements that are considered in this chapter.

Ideology is another factor to consider in determining the importance of leadership. David Galula emphasizes that in an insurgency campaign, the movement's leadership relies on a well-grounded cause that is used to mobilize support among the population.[140] The importance of ideology to the organization enhances the overall significance of leadership. Ideology helps an insurgent organization define objectives and its strategy for attaining them, by way of attachment of influence, "to an idea, a doctrine, or a creed."[141] The next section considers the manner in which ideology affects group and organizational processes.

2. Ideological Thresholds

Even where ideology is important, social comparison and social influence affect individual decision-making and behavior. Mark Granovetter considered how social processes affect decision-making in a group of individuals with varying levels of ideological commitment. With the notion of individual participation thresholds, he accounted for differences in ideological conviction and cost/benefit assessments as he answered for the power of group processes. Specifically, Granovetter examined diffusion of behavior among individuals with various thresholds for joining a riot. When contemplating whether or not to riot, he discovered each person to be more or less

[140] David Galula and John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, 8.

[141] Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," *American Sociological Review* 15, no. 6 (December 1950): 731.

inclined based on varying degrees of ideological commitment and risk aversion. Seeing others riot, however, lessened a reluctant individual's perceived costs while raising their perceived benefits. Accordingly, individual willingness to risk the behavior was strengthened. In this way, each individual can be portrayed as having a threshold—the number of fellow members required to join in a potentially costly behavior.[142]

This model helps depict how ideology weighs in the minds of individuals as they consider what others are doing in the context of ideology and potential costs and benefits for a given set of choices. It demonstrates the existence of social contagion within a group even when ideological factors are involved. When the state alters the cost and benefit equation for an insurgent—either through elevating the potential costs of staying in the insurgency, or raising the benefits of disengagement by way of credible inducements—it helps to offset the influences of ideology. An inverse of the joining process can be expected as the insurgency loses momentum. In turn, the state becomes more legitimate, and disengagement programs can start to peel away layers of less committed participants.

3. Relevance of Shared Values

Ideology also impacts group processes and affects the functionality of an organization. That is to say, ideology affects how an organization responds when network ties are altered or altogether severed—when members leave and unfamiliar replacements arrive. The significant role that values play in business organizations helps bring this to light. Values are similar to, and likely a significant aspect of, ideology. They are a fundamental feature of an organization in that they provide a foundation for informing acceptable behavior.[143] The presence of a high degree of shared values indicates that all levels of an organization feel the same objectives are important. To the extent they are central and shared, values have a significant impact on individual members as they help

[142] Granovetter, "Economic Action," 481–510.

[143] Jennifer A. Chatman, "Improving Interactional Organizational Research: A Model of Person-Organization Fit," *Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 3 (1989): 333–349.

individuals perceive and make similar sense of events[144] and can cause members to feel greater investment in the organization's mission and purpose.[145] Most importantly from the perspective of the organization, those individuals whose values most closely align with the organization have been shown to be more committed and satisfied,[146] identify more with the organization,[147] and have a fewer intentions to leave.[148]

Watrous, Huffman, and Pritchard studied the extent to which various degrees of shared values affected performance as organizations progressed after experiencing turnover. While it might be expected that this condition would galvanize a work unit during an adverse period of turnover, they discovered that a high degree of shared values actually increased the negative impact of turnover on performance. Performance likely suffered because the lack of shared values in the new members resulted in a loss of social capital. Conversely, the replacement of higher-level leaders resulted in increased performance when a high degree of shared values was present. These differing outcomes point to the importance of proximity and the cohesive potential of values. Despite making acceptance of new members more challenging, shared values seem to allow members to persevere in a state of adversity where their immediate networks weren't directly impacted. Watrous et al also considered the possibility that the turnover of leaders is viewed to be a reflection of the organization's stability and values become more important when there is instability.[149] To the extent that a degree of shared values is present and turnover is distant, a work unit is better able to cope with instability.

The demonstrated importance of values once again reinforces the idea that altering or severing network ties that are closest is detrimental to the commitment of

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[144] Bruce M. Meglino, Elizabeth C. Ravlin, and Cheryl L.Adkins, 1989, "A Work Values Approach to Corporate Culture: A Field Test of the Value Congruence Process and its Relationship to Individual Outcomes," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 74, 424–432.

[145] D. M. Cable and D. S. DeRue, "The Convergent and Discriminant Validity of Subjective Fit Perceptions," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 87 (2002): 875–884.

[146] Chatman, "Improving Interactional."

[147] Cable and DeRue, "Convergent and Discriminant."

[148] Chatman, "Improving Interactional."

[149] Kristen M. Watrous, Ann H. Huffman, and Robert D. Pritchard, "When Coworkers and Managers Quit: The Effects of Turnover and Shared Values on Performance," *Journal of Business and Psychology* 21, no. 1 (Fall 2006): 116–20.

individual members in an organization, as well as to the overall functioning of the network. Although the cohesive value of ideology in an insurgency cannot be disputed, this further strengthens the notion that severing network relationships can be leveraged to obtain wide-ranging effects among individuals and the overall functioning of the insurgency campaign.

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IV. WHAT WILL THE ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE WHEN ITS MEMBERS DISENGAGE?

A. INTRODUCTION

One of the most important goals of any counterinsurgency is to provide security to the people by way of reducing the threat of violence to the population. Regardless of its target population and strategy, disengagement seeks to contribute to this effort by reducing the insurgency's capacity to commit violence. As a disengagement program removes fighters from an insurgency, it undermines human and social capital, as well as the organization's leaders and ideology. When these effects coalesce with the psychosocial processes in individual members, the effects become contagious across social networks and help further weaken the insurgency. If disengagement is to contribute to a successful counterinsurgency effort in this manner, I contend the most efficient strategies should adhere to the principles that follow. 1) Disengagement by low-level members of an insurgency campaign helps to reduce levels of violence by decreasing its capacity to conduct operations. 2) Disengagement programs will be more effective and contagion effects will be more widespread when an insurgency campaign is in a state of decline; 3) Disengagement programs will be more effective and contagion effects more widespread in an insurgency campaign when the state is perceived to be legitimate. Finally, 4) disengagement by high-ranking leaders of an insurgency campaign has greater consequences for the organization than disengagement by low-level members.

B. DISENGAGEMENT'S EFFECTS ON INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS

1. Disengagement by Low-Level Members

Disengagement by low-level members of an insurgency campaign helps to reduce levels of violence by decreasing its capacity to conduct operations. Irrespective of the internal and external dynamics of an insurgency campaign, disengagement strategies can be employed to reduce its capacity to commit violence. The removal of fighters from the organization undermines human capital upfront. In turn, this reduces social capital and creates further challenges to organizational effectiveness. The initial loss, that of human

capital, occurs when individuals leave an insurgency and take with them knowledge and skills. Insurgents who have a greater degree of specialization, and those that have leadership responsibilities and are more influential are the ones whose removal will creates the greatest amount of disruption in the insurgency's operations. The acquired technical and tactical abilities of an insurgent are not replaced easily; simply increasing investment in recruiting is not likely to compensate for their loss. Therefore, an attempt to replace human capital at any level requires time and can be very difficult. As a result, the insurgency's overall capacity to generate violence is diminished in the short term, and potentially in the long term.

More significantly—especially at the lower level—the exit of fighters from an insurgency negatively alters the organization's social fabric. In an organization, certain individuals hold more social capital than others. To the extent that relationships are consistent, behavioral familiarity results among members and helps create trust and interaction norms. The element of trust is particularly important to the functioning of the organization because it lowers potential transaction costs. This notion of trust is particularly salient for members of covert and illicit groups since it is necessary for personal and operational security and efficient operations more broadly. When members of trusted networks choose to disengage from violence, insurgent networks must adapt and replace missing actors in order to continue operations. The trust, however, will not be immediately replaced.

When lost, social capital is more difficult to replace that human capital. Expressive network relationships are more slowly and deliberately replaced, limiting the organization's collective social capital and effectiveness until trusted relationships with actors occupying new positions are able to develop. Trust and security among members will be further weakened as more fighters disengage. Insurgents who continue to fight will fear that disengaged fighters will give the state intelligence in exchange for additional inducements. Finally, disengagement promises to undermine trust by increasing opportunities for infiltration, either real or perceived, as new members are recruited to replace those that left and as old members return to fight after imprisonment.

2. Disengagement and Insurgency Life Cycle

Disengagement programs will be more effective and contagion effects will be more widespread when an insurgency campaign is in a state of decline. In a state of organizational decline, an insurgency campaign experiences a relative decrease in its capacity to present a viable alternative to the state. This decrease might be caused by increased effectiveness of state security forces, reduced support from the population and other resource providers, or realization by current members that an organization's goals are unattainable or at least less preferred to what the government or another group promises. Decline diminishes the insurgency's legitimacy, as well as organizational operations and overall objectives. The insurgency campaign's diminished ability to mobilize resource support in the form of fighters, weapons, and finances erodes its capacity to provide security and other services it previously provided the population. The degree to which an organization declines is likely to affect the general population and influence its willingness to provide resources, intelligence, and protection, as well as new members. Finally, as the movement becomes less effective, it produces lower levels of member satisfaction and dedication.

To the extent that decline becomes apparent and the insurgency appears to weaken, insurgents begin to consider other alternatives. When the state provides a viable way out of the insurgency, fighters are more likely to disengage since it is increasingly in their perceived best interests for the future. The consideration of alternatives is particularly salient for low-level members and those less committed ideologically—those who do not embody the organization's values and ideals to the extent that more committed individuals do.

Although the significance of ideology typically confuses cost-benefit analysis, it is reasonable to expect that such an approach will be most applicable, relatively speaking, in this condition. Expectancy-valence theory[150] suggests that when people choose to make certain decisions or behave in a certain way, they seek to maximize the probability of a valued outcome. In other words, they seek to maximize the expected value and

[150] Lyman W. Porter and Edward E. Lawler, *Managerial Attitudes and Performance*, Homewood, IL: R.D. Irwin, 1968.

probability of expected benefits while minimizing costs. As the insurgency is in decline, the reduced availability of resources similarly limits what it can provide its members, as well as its capacity to enforce member loyalty. Equally, it is also worth considering that the threat of capture to the insurgent is also likely to increase as the insurgency's resources diminish. The option to disengage fills a potential void in the near term as well as in the long term and is much more appealing considering the increased possibility of a movement's ultimate demise as it moves progressively through stages of decline.

It is expected that an insurgency's decline will create associated skepticism in its long-term viability, objectives, and ideology, thus creating a great deal of uncertainty among its membership, particularly those at lower levels who have access to less information. In the earlier examination of networks, it was learned that expressive networks are more important than instrumental networks when individuals make decisions concerning values and behavior. As individuals decide to disengage, social psychological processes within expressive networks will be significant as individuals evaluate future threats and opportunities by way of social comparison. Comparison is known to be more important for informing decision-making processes in risky or ambiguous situations. This is particularly relevant when an insurgency is in decline and the risk of capture is elevated while information about the insurgency's future is held more closely than normal and uncertainty increases.

This will fuel exponential effects for the organization when one individual's disengagement prompts other members to consider recourse to the insurgency while being informed by social comparison and social influence. A phenomenon similar to turnover contagion—whereby disengagement by one or more creates a snowball effect because of social contagion amongst the insurgency's members—can be expected to be particularly relevant in this condition. During decline, the insurgency has less of a capacity to enforce dedication to the campaign in response to alternative inducements from the state. For the insurgency overall, the impacts on the stayers and their relative tendency toward leaving will be positively related to the number of individuals who leave, and will be particularly meaningful for individuals with whom the disengaged persons have the strongest and closest network ties. Expansive disengagement that is

expected to follow will severely undermine both human and social capital, thus amplifying the effects described in the first principle and bringing about an even more rapid organizational decline.

Conversely, enticing insurgents to disengage from violence during a period of campaign growth is significantly more challenging. As an insurgency campaign grows, it is likely to experience an increased level of legitimacy among its members and the population in general. As long as it continues to accumulate resources and grow, these outcomes will validate the insurgency's operations, as well as its ideology and objectives. Provided the movement's ideology and activities remain consistent with the original orientation when members first joined, the push or pull factors that lead members to disengage will not have to do with the organization. Rather, disengagement in this circumstance will more likely be prompted by personal reasons and is not likely to spread its appeal to other members in the organization.

3. Disengagement and State Legitimacy

Disengagement programs will be more effective and contagion effects more widespread in an insurgency campaign when the state is perceived to be legitimate. The legitimacy of the state is most relevant in three facets. First, the state must present a set of inducements that it is able to credibly deliver to insurgents who disengage. To complement these incentives, state security forces must present a credible threat of death or imprisonment for those fighters that continue to participate in the insurgency. Finally, the state must prove itself to be on the path to being a viable entity that is able to provide security and governance for its people.

These factors are important because psychosocial processes among members are likely to reinforce a disengagement program's success or failure in a virtuous or vicious cycle when disengagement program feedback is provided to the fighters remaining in the insurgent organization by those that leave first. When contemplating leaving an insurgency campaign, an individual's observation of similar others leaving provides them with information about the threats and opportunities that exist outside the organization. This is particularly relevant for the embedded individual who wants to understand what is

potentially lost and gained by leaving. This sacrifice can consist of loss of benefits an organization provides, like pay and the social support of fellow members. The greater the overall loss stands to be, the more difficult it will be for the individual to disengage.

Cumulative effects can be expected to occur to the extent that the state offers viable opportunities that are deemed legitimate. The state must take care to ensure the phenomena of social comparison work in its favor. It must make certain that disengagement programs are deemed credible in terms of promised inducements and do not pose an unrealistic threat to those who participate. To the extent that this does not occur, those remaining in the organization will be less enticed to replicate the decision of others in their expressive networks.

Constant evaluation of the threats and opportunities that accompany the option to continue fighting also takes place in the minds of insurgents. This process, too, is informed by social comparison. The most relevant observation is the real or perceived threat of capture or injury, and the severity of imprisonment and punishment for those who are taken into custody by state security forces. This makes obvious the importance credible threats from the state have in complementing disengagement programs in order to make any strategy as effective as possible.

4. Disengagement and Rank of Members

Disengagement by high-ranking leaders of an insurgency campaign has greater consequences for the organization than disengagement by low-level members. Enjoying greater influence due to position within the insurgency, a leader—one who is expected to embody the campaign's values and ideal behavior, and have increased access to information—by disengaging, provokes questioning of the organization's ideological foundation and the attainability of its objectives. Owing to the influence of the leader's position and deviation from expected behavior, other members are more likely to also disengage from violence.

The insurgent organization selects individuals who reflect the ideals, behavior, and attributes valued by the organization to serve in leadership positions. Most significantly, these persons are also chosen for their ideological alignment with the

organization. To the extent that leaders represent model prototypicality, they are able to exercise the greatest degree of influence among the insurgency's fighters. For these reasons, they are usually placed in central positions within the network. These positions tend to give them greater access to and control over information, as well as closer ties to the dominant coalition in the organization. Together, these characteristics reinforce their perceived power and influence.

Leaders are especially important in an insurgency since they symbolize the organization and create in its members a shared understanding and belief in its purpose and the ideology that is its foundation. They help to define the values and ideals that guide the behavior of members at all levels and the organization as a whole. Through these functions, as well as through more routine actions, insurgent leaders give fighters a sense of purpose and meaning to what they do and the sacrifices they make. To the extent that a leader is able to do these things to guide a determined effort, it will help the insurgency thrive.

Along with the responsibilities above, peers, subordinates, and superiors place expectations on leaders in an insurgent network. These expectations are particularly relevant to subordinates when disagreement occurs among members of an insurgent network and doubt arises concerning which individual judgments are valid. For the insurgency's members, the process through which they attempt to resolve this conflict will tend to value and more closely scrutinize leaders. This will be particularly salient when leaders disconfirm member expectations of prototypicality. Such is the case when a leader disengages from violence.

Leader disengagement also has other significant representative impacts for other members in the organization. To a great extent, these occur because of the access to information and other key organizational members that accompany a leader's centrally located position in the insurgent network. As mentioned, the ideological alignment and prototypicality of individuals in leadership positions is what permits them to be trusted with formal authority and more closely held knowledge. For members, disengagement by

an actor with these characteristics is perceived to imply they have relevant information that has created in them dissatisfaction with the organization and/or its future and thus led them to leave.

That being said, this activity will not have the same impacts during a state of decline as it does during periods of growth because of the process of attribution. Recalling from the examination of attribution in the previous chapter, leadership is used by an insurgency's members to explain events, particularly when they do not align with expectations. Regardless of actual causes, individuals tend to assign personal accountability for organizational outcomes in order to feel in control. For that reason, the ability of leaders to influence followers is closely related to the insurgency's success.

Organizational successes and failures are not only attributed to leaders, but alter member perceptions of leadership in the same direction the insurgency is trending. Leaders in an insurgency can be expected to enjoy greater influence during periods of growth and their disengagement will lead to impacts for other members in the organization. That being said, the overall strength and success of the organization will prevent these effects from being significantly detrimental. As a result, the most opportunistic strategy to employ to take advantage of a leader who wants to disengage is not that of individual disengagement, but collective disengagement guided by that leader, on the largest scale possible.

Conversely, given that effective leadership is expected to translate into organizational success, leaders who are associated with decline are deemed ineffective and experience diminished credibility and influence. Their perceived responsibility for decline diminishes the social psychological influence they have over other members. Concern over the legitimacy of ideological matters that is caused, and/or exacerbated, by decline further leads to distrust of institutional authority and the behavior of leaders in the organization. In this instance, leader disengagement will not be significant because of the influence, but because it reinforces the observed decline in the insurgency's ability to conduct violence.

The exception to the reactions anticipated above is that of the charismatic leader. This type of leader will be relied upon even more, not less, during periods of crisis. Rather than be subject to diminished levels of influence—owing to the importance for a leader to provide meaning and direction to followers—the most inspirational and effective leaders will be relied upon to guide their organizations out of dark times. If they are unable to respond positively to member and organizational expectations and instead choose to disengage, however, it will have massive repercussions. For individual fighters, the corresponding effects will be even more salient than if it was a more normal leader and the consequences for the campaign, more broadly, will also be exceedingly devastating.

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V. CASE STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine three cases of disengagement programs being employed as part of larger and more comprehensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Each case will be analyzed to determine the specific strategies employed by the programs, their effectiveness in reducing levels of violence, and consideration of social contagion effects. Specifically, the dependent variable, the violent attacks conducted by the insurgency, will be measured against the independent variable, insurgent disengagement from violence. Finally, intervening variables that have not been analyzed but might be particularly relevant will be considered, along with specific lessons learned. The case studies will include disengagement programs in Vietnam, Malaya, and Afghanistan.

B. VIETNAM WAR CASE STUDY

1. Description

During the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese government (GVN) offered opportunities for defection to Viet Cong (VC) insurgents and North Vietnamese Army soldiers through its Chieu Hoi Program. Meaning 'open arms,' the program served as an alternative to the hardships of guerrilla life as it also strived to politically indoctrinate former enemies and offered vocational training.[151] Beginning in 1963, it sought to weaken the insurgency over the course of the war as it accounted for the defection of 194,000 insurgents—known as 'ralliers' or Choi Han. It attempted to further weaken insurgent support through public rejection of the National Liberation Front's objectives by former adherents who had become Choi Han.[152] VC insurgents were eligible to

[151] J. A. Koch, RAND Corporation, and United States, Advanced Research Projects Agency, *The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963–1971*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1973, 78–83.

[152] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* v.

participate in the program by way of surrender or upon being taken prisoner. NVA soldiers, on the other hand, could not be given Hoi Chanh status unless they surrendered.[153]

The program's three principles were National Community, National Concord, and National Progress.[154] In addition to amnesty and financial support for themselves and their families,[155] defectors could voluntarily take part in rewards programs for turning in weapons, providing information about enemy personnel and resources, and influencing the defection of other insurgents. In the spirit of reconciliation, these programs were strictly optional, but carried with them significant financial appeal.[156] In 1967, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky further increased the incentive for defection with a new policy of "Dai Doan Ket." With the objective of appealing to high-ranking VC, this program advanced a policy of National Reconciliation that promised to assist defectors in obtaining careers commensurate with their ability and experience while still providing them amnesty and complete political and civil rights.[157]

2. Effectiveness

The motives for most Choi Han had to do with personal reasons, and not ideology. In fact, interviews with defectors showed general ignorance concerning formal Marxism.[158] Chief among the factors prompting defection were the GVN's military effectiveness, an unsettled and rugged life in the insurgency, limited freedom and constant supervision, uncertainty over their future, disillusionment with the VC's policies and ability to liberate South Vietnam, and an elevated perception of the GVN and the credibility of its Chieu Hoi promises.[159] For the most part, defection in these instances

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[153] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 13.

[154] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* viii.

[155] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 78.

[156] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 70–73.

[157] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 36.

[158] J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, *Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1966, 62.

[159] Carrier and Thomson, *Viet Cong Motivation,* 31–48.

could not be viewed as support for the GVN. Rather, defectors maintained belief in certain aspects of the insurgency, but their Marxist indoctrination was not sufficient enough to overcome personal interests and the thought of a protracted campaign.

Additionally, with few exceptions, almost all Choi Han came from lower levels in the insurgency's ranks.[160] High-ranking members were viewed to have made a psychological break with their former lives and were fully committed to their cause.[161] Their conviction was supposedly accompanied by an ardent belief in an inevitable victory that became vital to their self-identity.[162] From these members' perspective, personal sacrifice had to be accompanied by political justification in order to be sufficient to cause them to defect.[163] In interviews with 166 defectors, the average period of service for volunteers was 36 months, while those defectors who had been coerced to join the insurgency only served an average of 7.5 months prior to defecting.[164] This indicates that those who volunteered—those whose member loyalty and ideological commitment were the strongest—were the most difficult to attract by the Chieu Hoi Program. Likewise, enticing the most high-ranking and hard-core of the VC was challenging since they feared retribution from the government and a loss of status if they left the insurgency. Recognizing this, as well as the relative importance of these members, the National Reconciliation campaign mentioned above aimed to compensate for the economic and status losses that were perceived to accompany exit from the insurgency.[165]

3. Quantitative Analysis

The Chieu Hoi Program recognized the significance of high-ranking members of the Viet Cong and NVA to the enemy's Marxist ideology, and therefore sought to encourage their disengagement. Although it was unsuccessful in appealing to high-

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[160] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* v, 10.

[161] Carrier and Thomson, *Viet Cong Motivation,* 32–33.

[162] Paul Berman, *Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974.

[163] *Improving the Effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi Program:* Simulmatics Corp., September 1967, 40.

[164] Berman, *Revolutionary Organization.*

[165] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 38.

ranking insurgents, the GVN managed to effectively appeal to low-ranking insurgents and had an adverse affect on the Viet Cong and NVA insurgency and its ability to commit violence and recruit members.

In Figure 1, an analysis of the correlation between the disengagement of low-ranking members and VC attacks shows a positive relationship between disengagement and the insurgency's growth. This suggests the Chieu Hoi campaign was mildly successful in combating the insurgency by removing a significant number of insurgents from the battlefield. Because Viet Cong and NVA disengaged for mostly personal reasons and their leaving did not represent any real dissatisfaction with the organization and its objectives, the cascading effects on the rest of the organization were insignificant. Accordingly, disengagement behavior neither spread nor was it unable to have significantly detrimental consequences for the overall insurgency.



Figure 1. Correlation of Disengaged Personnel with Growth of the Insurgency in Vietnam (1965–1971)[166]

[166] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 11.

DCB Software Testing, Inc. *A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War: 1965-1972,* Carr's Compendium of the Vietnam War, [Seattle, WA]: DCB Software Testing, Inc, 2005, vol. 3, 128.

Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 191.

The period surrounding the 1968 Tet offensive represents a unique relationship that is not found elsewhere in the course of the Chieu Hoi program in Vietnam. Namely, a period of decline in the insurgency accompanied a period of increased disengagement. It is now known that the effects of the 1968 Tet offensive were significant for the NVA and the VC. Operations made defection more difficult immediately following Tet, but by April 1968, the number of defectors began to increase when enemy combatants realized the Marxist insurgency had failed to achieve the Tet goals to incite a popular uprising and hold territory after the offensive was complete. At the same time, the GVN had expanded its presence and control in the countryside. Given that 42% of 1968's defections occurred during the final three months of the year, it is plausible these were a reflection of the perceptions the defectors had concerning the condition of insurgency, as well as the overall success of Tet.[167]

Although there are no reliable figures available and evidence is anecdotal, it should be recognized that MACV reported a distinct increase in the rank of defectors during this period.[168] It is interesting to note that the defection rate the following year was nearly double the program's second highest annual rate. Even though this was partially because of the unsettled outcome of Tet as mentioned above, it is possible that the rate was intensified further by increased defection by high-ranking members. Such a phenomenon would indicate alignment by low-level defectors with those insurgent leaders that believed the insurgency was increasingly susceptible to defeat at the time.[169] Finally, it should be noted that enemy attacks demonstrate an appreciable period of decline from 1969 onward. It is safe to assume the reason this was not matched by an appreciable rise in disengagement due to the fact that initiation of Vietnamization and U.S. withdrawal hinted at capitulation and diminished the enemy's need to exert influence through attacks.

A comparative analysis of annual growth rates of the program, shown in Figure 2, provides insight into the effects of social contagion among VC at the macro level. From

[167] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 45.

[168] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 45.

[169] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 19.

year to year, the number of disengaged VC fluctuated somewhat significantly, indicating the relative popularity of the program. In all years, there was at least a 30% change from the year prior. The growth in popularity from the previous year was most prominent in 1966 and 1969. Given that 1966 was the second year of the program, it is likely that the program appealed to the least committed of the VC during this time—those who hoped to obtain rewards to alleviate the economic hardships that had motivated them to join the insurgency in the first place. The second year of extraordinary popularity was 1969. This was likely due to the Tet offensive and the heavy fighting, losses, and extreme conditions to which it subjected VC fighters but had simultaneously made disengaging in 1968 much more difficult. As hypothesized, the social contagion effects were not particularly salient beyond these years because the reasons for disengaging were more personal and did not have to do with the insurgency campaign.



Figure 2. Correlation of Contagion Effects and the Insurgency in Vietnam (1965–1971)

Inherently, the VC and NVA understood the potential significance of social contagion from Cheiu Hoi since they considered defection to be an offense punishable by death.[170] The threats of high-ranking disengagement and social contagion were guarded

[170] Carrier and Thomson, *Viet Cong Motivation*, 54.

against throughout the war, albeit anecdotally, by enemy political cadres promptly responding to the defection of any high-ranking VC with intense and severe periods of reindoctrination.[171]

4. Observations

Ultimately, the GVN's inherent distrust of the program and understandable reluctance to reward their former enemies kept the program from reaching its full potential. Lack of support by GVN was further attributed to the view that it was a program being pushed on them by the U.S.[172] Interviews with Hoi Chanh around 1967 revealed that many VC considered defection but the credibility of the program prevented them from doing so as they feared they wouldn't be able to provide for their families.[173] The perceived impact of offer's credibility was reinforced by the increase in defection after the U.S. began to offer funding in 1967.[174]

The case of the Cheiu Hoi program in Vietnam amplifies the importance of state stability for any disengagement program. In 1971, the defection rate slowed to its lowest levels since inception. This was likely a function of the GVN's instability because of upcoming Presidential elections. At the same time, propaganda and U.S. advisory efforts were scaled down;[175] all further reduced the appeal and effectiveness of Cheiu Hoi. This suggests an important intervening variable to be analyzed when determining the appeal of a disengagement program.

Since the insurgency's success is a function of both its growth condition and the potency of the state, it is necessary to also take into account the viability of the state's institutions, as well as its capacity to provide governance and security for the population. The state's economic stability and opportunities are also relevant to the extent they are likely to provide a defector with alternative means of success in society. In Vietnam,

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[171] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 19.

[172] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 39.

[173] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 33.

[174] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* vi.

[175] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* viii.

there was a negative correlation between the stability and continuity of the political leadership and incidents of defection. This relationship can be observed in the correlation of monthly defectors with political developments in Figure 3



Figure 3. Correlation of Monthly Defectors, 1963–1967, with Political Developments[176]

The Vietnamese Cheiu Hoi program offers several insights into the potential of disengagement programs. In order to prevent the former fighters from turning back to the insurgency to provide for their family, the program sought to use defectors' military skills and knowledge of enemy forces to enhance the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency forces. Most notably, the Kit Carson Scout program was a voluntary one that employed defectors alongside U.S. forces. Defected members of the enemy served as scouts embedded in U.S. units and provided invaluable expertise concerning the language, terrain, and enemy tactics.[177] In addition, the third party inducement program provided economic incentives for insurgents to leverage their influence to advance social contagion in their respective expressive networks to encourage defection of their allies to

[176] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 23.

[177] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program,* 101–102.

the Cheiu Hoi program.[178] Lastly, the Cheiu Hoi program seems to have affected the supply side of the insurgency through its impact on VC recruitment. This, too, is quite possibly a result of social influence as Hoi Chanh settled in villages and contagion effects fueled by shared testimony of the ominous conditions as a fighter in the insurgency.[179]

C. MALAYAN EMERGENCY CASE STUDY

1. Description

When the British returned to Malaya to reestablish control of the country as World War II came to a close, they discovered the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) had control in many areas of the country. In an effort resembling collective disengagement, the British Military Government met with MPAJA leadership to negotiate its disbandment and disarmament. They made the appeal to the MPAJA that a peaceful settlement would afford them a more promising future than if they elected to return to the jungle and wage a guerrilla war. The MPAJA leaders opposed the government's offer and sought to attain either *de facto* or *de jure* status as an enduring force that would complement, or replace, the Malaya Regiment. However, they made significant and rigid demands during negotiations rather than immediately resorting to guerrilla warfare. In the end, the disarmament effort failed to deplete the MPAJA of its surplus arms and soon after officially disbanding, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) replaced the MPAJA with Communist front organizations. These organizations soon turned their attention to defeating the government through terror attacks in the form of murders and abductions, and eventually to an open insurgency.[180]

In an effort to combat the size of the insurgency, as well as the real cost of operations conducted to kill insurgent fighters, the Government of Malaya (GOM) developed an amnesty program to entice enemy insurgents to stop fighting. In addition to amnesty, the GOM's rewards-for-surrender program offered a bribe for insurgents to

[178] Koch et al., *Chieu Hoi Program*, 72–73.

[179] R. W. Komer and United States, Advanced Research Projects Agency, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972, 12.

[180] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 4–5.

defect. Rewards were scaled according to the rank of the insurgent with 8,000 current U.S. dollars for a soldier, and $250,000 rewarded for a Central Committee Chairman. Additional rewards were given to those who provided information leading to the killing or capture of insurgency members. In support of this effort, the GOM's psychological warfare was directed at elevating the surrender rate. Two of its main objectives were to ally insurgent fears of maltreatment or being killed by security forces in the process of defecting.[181] It helped further improve the appeal of the campaign by utilizing the surrendered personnel who held an appreciation for the minds of the insurgents.[182]

2. Effectiveness

When considering defection, the deliberation of many individual insurgents required resolving the dilemma of which side was better able to provide protection. Therefore, the success of reward-for-surrender program relied on the government's ability to provide security for those that defected. The program took hold slowly after the GOM and its security forces proved to be credible and able to provide defectors with protection. Additionally, the growing capacity of the various security forces enabled the GOM to place ever-increasing amounts of pressure on insurgent forces, thus creating uncertainty and anxiety among the organization's members. As these events converged, it produced a large number of insurgent defections, as well as a plethora of intelligence for the GOM.[183]

All told, 2,702 insurgents surrendered during the course of the campaign, a figure that is particularly significant when compared to the total of 6,710 enemy insurgents who were killed in action. The impact of the defections extended beyond the removal of individual fighters from the battlefield as other insurgents were killed or captured based on the intelligence they provided.[184] As defector intelligence was acted upon, it increased

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[181] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 71–73.

[182] John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, 126.

[183] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 74.

[184] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 74–75.

the pressure felt by members of the insurgency and profoundly affected morale among insurgents. Finally, near the end of 1955, the insurgency realized its efforts had

culminated as MCP leader Chin Peng made an appeal for peace.[185] Later, the GOM's combined pressure on the insurgency and offers of amnesty yielded significant mass surrenders in 1957 and 1958.[186]

3. Quantitative Results

The Malayan program sought to encourage the disengagement of insurgents at all levels as evidenced by the scaled rewards for insurgent defection. Although specific data regarding the rank of those that participated in the program is not available, the effectiveness of disengagement is clearly correlated with the insurgency's life cycle shown in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Correlation of Disengaged Personnel with Growth of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1954)[187]

Figure 4 demonstrates an overall negative relationship between the disengagement of Malayan insurgents and the insurgency's growth. During the initial stages of growth for the insurgency, after 1949, there is a consistent relationship between the number of insurgents leaving the organization and the campaign's demonstrated level of violence. After peaking in intensity near the end of 1951, the insurgency began a

[185] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 10.

[186] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 10.

[187] Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency*, 190–202.

precipitous drop in activity. Simultaneously, the annual rate at which insurgents disengaged increased until it reached its apex in 1953. Relative decline in disengagement after 1953 can be attributed to the fact that there were fewer fighters remaining to disengage, and those left were most ideologically hardcore (see Figure 6). Decline in the insurgency overall is evidenced in the reduction of attacks from 450-500 a month at the end of 1951 to only 100 by January 1953. Similarly, the monthly rate at which insurgent fighters were killed also sharply increased to 70–100 for three consecutive years to the end of 1953. A commonly held belief that the insurgency was to soon meet its demise become apparent in 1955 when the MCP leader, Chin Peng, made gestures to seek peace.[188]

Even though causation cannot be established as it is impossible to determine whether the GOM's disengagement program became more appealing as the insurgency declined or the insurgency declined as more insurgents disengaged, it can be reasonably assumed that the presence of the GOM's amnesty programs helped facilitate a more rapid decline in the insurgency. The way in which this program contributed to the counter-insurgency effort in Malaya confirms the hypothesized result that disengagement programs are more effective during periods of decline, irrespective of target.

A comparative analysis of annual growth rates of the Malayan program, shown in Figure 5, provides an indication of social contagion effects within the insurgency over time. Clearly, the popularity spread most at the beginning. However, unlike in Vietnam where initial growth was likely a function of the program's appeal to the less committed, this growth rate would seem to be indicative of an extremely significant contagion effect in light of the insurgent motivations shown in Figure 6. During the program's initial period, *dislike of policy* is cited as insurgents' primary reason for disengaging. This appears to confirm the expectation that motivations for leaving that have more to do with the organization and less to do with the individual cause will resonate and thus become contagious among members in expressive networks. Such a massively significant growth from the first year to the second is also likely representative of the feedback provided

[188] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 9–11.

from the experiences of the insurgents who first accepted amnesty. After 1949, the pattern of growth happened as expected. The relative lack of contagion effects was represented by negative growth until the insurgency reached the apex of its activity in 1951. The growth and contagion of the program trended positively from that point until 1954 when the insurgency reached its lowest point since 1948.



Figure 5. Correlation of Contagion Effects and the Malayan Emergency (1949–1955)

Like the NVA and VC, the MLRA high command took extraordinary measures to guard against contagion effects within the insurgency: "checks, controls, and inquisitions multiplied; sentries watched sentries; watchers watched everyone." Beyond the loss experienced when insurgents actually disengaged, the guarding against defection for fear of its effects resulted in a significant loss of productivity. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the role the program played in the defeat of the insurgency went beyond what is expressed in the total number of disengaged fighters.[189]

A detailed insight into the motivations of those that disengaged is shown in Figure 6. This figure shows that the majority of those who defected from the insurgency during its growth period, as well as the very beginning of its decline, did so because of dislike of the insurgency's policy. Over time, this figure is diminished. It can be reasoned that the most ardent believers in the organization remained members through the insurgency's

[189] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 75.

decline. They either waited until the campaign's objectives were increasingly unfavorable before accepting the GOM's offer, or never did disengage, in the case of the hard-core. Similarly, it is also interesting to note the rate at which insurgents disengaged because of hopelessness increased over time. This reinforces the notion of various levels of commitment to the campaign's ideology and varying individual thresholds, or limits, at which individuals choose to longer commit to an organization that appears to have unattainable objectives.

	Dislike of Policy	Hopelessness	Internal Friction	Impulse	Hunger
1949-1951	0.583	0.209	0.209	0.158	0
1952	0.512	0.122	0.147	0.414	0.268
Jan-June 1953	0.388	0.296	0.208	0.34	0.25
Jul-Dec 1953	0.197	0.217	0.35	0.211	0.249
Jan-Mar 1954	0.187	0.254	0.162	0.414	0.266
Apr-Jun 1954	0.138	0.311	0.173	0.68	0.356
Jul-Sep 1954	0.083	0.333	0.195	0.504	0.167
Oct-Dec 1954	0.051	0.257	0.077	0.64	0.36
Jan-Feb 1955	0	0.356	0.143	0.855	0.285

Figure 6. Reasons for Surrender Given by Surrendered Enemy Personnel, 1949–1955[190]

4. Observations

When viewed alongside the Vietnamese Cheiu Hoi program, the GOM's response in the Malayan Emergency demonstrates the significance of demonstrated state capacity in defeating an insurgency. An examination of the GOM's security forces shows that part time auxiliary police responsible for enhancing security in the villages grew from 17,000 in 1948, to 47,000 in 1949, and ultimately peaked at 200,000 in 1952. Similarly, the capacity of the police and special constable forces grew until 1952—and even beyond then, in the case of the police.[191] The GOM also incorporated disengaged insurgent fighters into the overall security effort. The Special Operations Volunteer Force was comprised of 25 member platoons made of surrendered and captured personnel and led

[190] Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency*, 65.

[191] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 11, 17, 20, 40, 41.

by a Police Lieutenant. The disengaged insurgents were volunteers and proved to be particularly useful in providing intelligence concerning the activities of the insurgency.[192]

Simultaneously, the British helped to limit the appeal of the insurgency by instilling people's confidence in the GOM as they successfully convinced most people that Malaya was on the path to early independence.[193]

D. AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY

1. Description

The Afghan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, also known as Programme Tahkim Sulh (PTS), was established in 2005 by presidential decree in Afghanistan. The purpose of PTS is "end inter-group armed hostilities, resolve unsettled national issues, facilitate healing of the wounds caused by past injustices, and take necessary measures to prevent the repeat of the civil war and its destruction."[194] The program sought to address what it believed to be some of the root causes of the Taliban insurgency's conflict with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). These included: 1) giving inaccurate information to the GIRoA and ISAF that results in action against innocents (i.e. settle scores), 2) harsh attitude of the GIRoA and its representatives toward the community, 3) lack of economic opportunities resulting in pursuit of illicit means, and 4) radicalization attempts by foreign elements in an effort to destabilize Afghanistan.[195]

PTS sought to achieve its goals by reaching out to insurgents by way of media campaigns and public invitations by the program's president, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. Regional offices provided insurgents with the opportunity to have face-to-face or mediated contact with PTS when considering joining the program. Once an individual

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[192] Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency*, 121, 139.

[193] Komer and United States, *Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 64.

[194] Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, "Home Page," (2010) *Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission,* Retrieved October 1, 2010, from http://www.pts.af/index.php?page=en_Home.

[195] Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, "Solutions," (2010) *Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission,* Retrieved October 1, 2010, from http://www.pts.af/index.php?page=en_Solutions.

decided to disengage from violence and reintegrated through PTS, the program attempted to provide jobs, resources, as well as opportunities for safe resettlement.[196] Additionally, participants in PTS were to receive a safe conduct letter in exchange for their pledge to live peacefully and accept the new Afghan constitution.[197]

2. Effectiveness

As of 2009, 7,106 insurgents joined PTS, and 30% of those also surrendered weapons. It also gained the release of 763 prisoners who agreed to join the peace process.[198] Despite the large number of participants, the effectiveness of the program is to be questioned. One of the main reasons for this is that nearly all of the disengaged Taliban are low-level fighters; very few are believed to be high ranking or influential figures in the insurgency.[199] Over a 6-year period from 2001 to the end of 2007, the GIRoA only reconciled with 22 "strategically significant" Taliban figures who reintegrated into public life. Of these, only three had played a role in the Taliban insurgency after 2001. The program has also been criticized for its vague eligibility requirements.[200] In some areas, it is believed that up to 50% of the participants in the PTS program were not legitimate fighters.[201]

Affiliation with networks outside the Taliban seems to have been a significant factor in their choosing reconciliation. For example, eight of the 22 were known as mujahideen commanders before joining with the Taliban. Although data is not available regarding the time period during which reconciliation agreements were made with high-ranking figures, it is known that almost no reconciliation has been reached with top-level

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196 Afghanistan National, "Solutions."

197 Michael Semple, *Reconciliation in Afghanistan*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009, 39, 54.

198 Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, "Accomplishments," (2010) *Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission*, Retrieved October 1, 2010, from http://www.pts.af/index.php?page=en_Accomplishments.

199 Matt Waldman and Afghanistan Analysts Network, "Golden Surrender? The Risks, Challenges, and Implications of Reintegration in Afghanistan," Discussion Paper 03/10, April 2010, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 3; Semple, *Reconciliation in Afghanistan*, 42.

200 Semple, *Reconciliation in Afghanistan*, 39–40.

201 Waldman and Afghanistan Analysts Network, "Golden Surrender?" 7.

leaders since the insurgency's escalation after 2005. The Afghan National Security Council, after its formation in 2002, made an effort to compile various blacklists developed by Afghan and U.S. security forces. Their focus narrowed on identification of members of the new insurgency. As of 2009, none of the blacklisted individuals had sought to come to terms with the government. This provides additional evidence to suggest that senior and mid-level insurgents do not presently perceive reconciliation to be a desirable option.[202]

3. Quantitative Analysis

Figure 8 demonstrates a positive relationship between the disengagement of Afghan insurgents and the insurgency's level of violence, followed by a negative relationship. As the insurgency was taking hold, the number of insurgents who disengaged continued to grow, until 2007. At that time, the insurgency approached unprecedented levels of violence and membership growth. Simultaneously, the number of persons who opted to disengage declined significantly. Overall, the PTS program appears to be have been largely ineffective in limiting violence or spread of the Taliban insurgency, albeit in a complex environment that included other failures.

[202] Semple, *Reconciliation in Afghanistan*, 41–42.



Figure 7. Correlation of Disengaged Personnel with Growth of the Insurgency in Afghanistan (2005–2009)[203]

The effects of social contagion among Afghan insurgents at the macro level are revealed through a comparative analysis of annual growth rates of disengaged insurgents, shown in Figure 8. The growth in popularity from the previous year was most prominent from 2005 to 2006. As this was the first full year of the PTS program, it is likely that the least committed of the insurgents joined the program to take advantage of the promises economic benefits that may have prompted them to join the insurgency in the first place. Social contagion effects beyond this initial year would not have been particularly salient beyond these years since economic justification is more personal and not viewed to be an objection to the insurgency's objectives.

Although the cumulative effects of disengagement were positive and primarily to the advantage of the GIRoA from 2005 to 2006, the PTS program became less popular between 2007 and 2008 when the insurgency began to gain increased amounts of control. According to the UN, the Taliban nearly quadrupled in strength from 2005 to 2009.[204]

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[203] United States, 2009, *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110–181)*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Retrieved November 29, 2010, from http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/October_2009.pdf, 12.

Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, "2008 Statistical Report," (2010) *Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission*, Retrieved October 1, 2010, from http://www.pts.af/index.php?page=en_2008+Statistic+Report.

[204] Scott Montgomery, "The Taliban: An Enigma Wrapped in a Riddle," *Reuters Online*, April 25, 2010, Retrieved on October 1, 2010, from http://2scottmontgomery.blogspot.com/2010/10/reutersreport-on-taliban-taliban-enigma.html.

Such an increase would have diminished the legitimacy of the GIRoA, and made the PTS program less appealing as a result. These effects demonstrate the significance of the insurgency's strength on the behavior of disengagement and its spread among members.



Figure 8. Correlation of Contagion Effects and the Insurgency in Afghanistan (2005–2009)

Despite its questionable levels of effectiveness and poor implementation, analysis of the PTS program by provincial office, in Figure 9 below, indicates the effects of social contagion at a more micro level. Participation numbers were rarely stable from one year to the next in provincial offices where the PTS program was administered for at least two consecutive years, the number of insurgents who elected to disengage increased or decreased by a factor of 40%, or less, in fewer than one of every six periods.

Provincial Office	2006	2007	2008
Headquarters	74.0%	***2.7%***	-45.8%
Kandahar	1266.7%	-48.1%	-67.8%
Herat	289.2%	-70.2%	-54.6%
Paktia	93.0%	-64.4%	67.6%
Kunduz	417.4%	***-26.1%***	***-34.0%***
Nangrahar	1400.0%	424.2%	-95.4%
Kunar	100.8%	***-34.3%***	-40.1%
Khost		257.1%	-54.4%
Zabul		73.8%	-57.5%
Helmand			-79.7%
Urzgan			187.2%
Farah			***0.0%***
Total	**241.9%**	**10.8%**	**-48.2%**

Figure 9. Annual Growth Rates of PTS Participation by Province[205]

Provincial Office	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Headquarters	127	221	227	123	698
Kandahar	21	287	149	48	505
Herat	93	362	108	49	609
Paktia	157	303	108	181	749
Kunduz	86	445	329	217	1077
Nangrahar	8	120	629	29	786
Kunar	119	239	157	94	609
Khost		70	250	114	434
Zabul		42	73	31	146
Helmand			143	29	172
Urzgan			78	224	302
Farah			64	64	128
Total	**611**	**2089**	**2315**	**1200**	**6215**

Figure 10. Annual PTS Participation by Province

It is not surprising that the Taliban has attempted to counter the contagion effects of the government's reintegration and reconciliation efforts. They have attempted to deter fighters from disengaging through a campaign of threats and intimidation. In the cases of

[205] Afghanistan National, "2008 Statistical Report."

those who have disengaged through PTS and other programs, they have exacted violent retribution against the former insurgents, as well as their family members.[206]

4. Observations

The PTS program has not received sustained commitment from the GIRoA or its Western supporters.[207] It has suffered from a lack of political will, as well as poor and corrupt management, as well as inadequate resources. It has also been unable to monitor recidivism; numerous low to mid-level commanders are known to have rejoined with the insurgency.[208] These failures are likely to be significantly intertwined; when an insurgent does not receive what had been promised for their agreed upon disengagement from violence, it is logical for them to return to the means by which they previously provided for their family—the insurgency.

Further diminishing the credibility of the government's offer, after 2001, senior Talibs were, at times, detained when they approached the GIRoA concerning local or informal amnesty offers. In many cases, they were sent to prison and sometimes tortured while in custody of Afghan security forces and interrogators. Consequently, many fear the legitimacy of government offers, as well as the possibility they might be incarcerated and abused. An example of this occurred in the southern region when those who reintegrated through PTS were promised a small piece of land, but the government never delivered. The GIRoA also failed to deliver on guarantees of protection and assistance with jobs.[209]

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[206] Waldman and Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Golden Surrender?” 7.

[207] Semple, *Reconciliation in Afghanistan*, 5.

[208] Waldman and Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Golden Surrender?” 3.

[209] Waldman and Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Golden Surrender?” 5–6.

Recognizing the criticisms of PTS, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program was recently initiated to disarm insurgents. Signed by President Hamid Karzai in June 2010, it is the most comprehensive effort to reconcile and reintegrate insurgents since 2001.[210]

[210] Tazreena Sajjad, "Peace at all Costs," *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit,* October 2010, Retrieved on October 1, 2010, from http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=26&task=doc_download&gid=815, vii.

VI. FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. CASE STUDY FINDINGS

Each of the case studies demonstrated correlation between disengagement phenomena and the insurgency campaign's lifecycle. Specifically, during periods where the number of attacks conducted by the insurgencies was increasing, there was a positive relationship between the number of insurgents who selected disengagement and attacks. That being said, at a certain point in the Malaya and Afghanistan case studies, a negative correlation prevailed. In Afghanistan, attacks continued to rise and a point was reached when the number of insurgents who disengaged started to decrease. Conversely, in Malaya, attacks reached a culminating point when they started to decline and the number of insurgents electing to disengage continued to increase. This suggests that when a point is reached that it becomes clear that one side—either the state or the insurgency—has a distinct advantage over the other, fighters will side with the strongest of the two sides in increasing numbers. In Afghanistan, it was the insurgency. In Malaya, it was the state.

The overall trends of disengaged insurgents relative to the trends of insurgency campaign attacks seems to substantiate the presence of an intervening variable. Namely, the lifecycle stage of the insurgency campaign helps determine a disengagement program's appeal. Even though disengagement at the individual level can help reduce an insurgency campaign's capacity for violence, disengagement programs will be most effective when the insurgency campaign is in a state of gradual decline. I contend that disengagement still has merits during periods of growth, but its consequences during periods of decline are more likely to be a factor in bringing an insurgency to a more expeditious end.

Contagion effects, measured in the case studies by the annual growth of disengagement totals, demonstrate a comparable correlation with the insurgency campaign's growth trend. Most interesting, though, is the fact that the Malaya program was the only one in which social contagion continued to trend at an increasingly positive rate until nearly the end. Notably, this is the only program studied that took place in the

context of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. In the other two cases, negative growth rates persisted alongside generally unsuccessful efforts to counter the VC and Taliban insurgencies.

An exception to the relationships described above was observed near the commencement of each of the three programs. A significant sharp increase in raw disengagement numbers and contagion occurred in at least one year as each program began. This seemingly occurred without regard to the diverse circumstances in each of the insurgencies. This suggests that a disengagement program can have immediate effects on an insurgency since it always has an appeal for less committed members by simply offering them an alternative to violence. To the extent that these individuals do not represent prototypical behavior or leave for reasons pertaining to the organization, their leaving will not have significant effects except to reduce the insurgency's human capital and capacity to conduct violence and consequently not spread pervasively among other members in the organization. However, the contagion effects of these defections have the potential to more significantly impact the organization's members when they are deemed to represent dissatisfaction with the organization, as demonstrated in Malaya where the contagion effects measured were shown to be the most significant for any one year period measured. Notably, in that instance, it is known that the prevailing reason for defection during this time was dislike of the insurgency campaign's policy.

Legitimacy was also a significant aspect of the appeal of the programs to insurgents. Although evidence was only anecdotal, it demonstrated that insurgents had to trust the promise of the government to not persecute them, as well as deliver them its promises. In the Vietnam and Afghanistan cases, the programs failed to reach some insurgents who viewed the respective governments to not be entirely credible. Conversely, the Malayan case demonstrated how elevated state capacity in the form of increased security force levels contributed to the government's credibility as it elevated the threat of death or imprisonment. Finally, the viability of the government and its ability to successfully govern in the long term was critical. In this sense, these findings align with the expectation that individuals will be less prone to disengage when it means joining the losing side.

Due to the lack of available data on the rank of individuals who disengaged in each of the case studies, the effects and importance of leader disengagement could not be verified. Leader disengagement is perhaps the most unpredictable of variables because insurgency campaigns and their relationship with their leaders—as well as the importance of specific leaders—is unique to each campaign and is one that can be in a constant state of change. That being said, disengagement by a leader is still preferred over any other member based on their centrality alone, but may not necessarily have drastic impacts unless the leader is able to guide collective disengagement by their organization.

B. WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED

Typically, when discussing attacks on insurgent networks, military theorists and strategists refer to efforts devised to capture and kill insurgents based on their importance in the insurgency campaign's instrumental network. This approach affects the network most directly by removing members and thus forcing it to adapt. It hedges its bets that the network will be unable to do so, or at least be ineffective while doing so. Although these types of activities are essential and must continue, the fact that it involves an involuntary physical separation from the organization only affects other members on a psychosocial basis by making real to them the potential for their own demise. As a result, they are not likely to produce far-reaching impacts for individual members and the overall social fabric of the organization.

Conversely, individual disengagement has the potential to devastate an organization and its members as its consequences spread among instrumental and expressive networks. Viewing these impacts through the network perspective holds great promise. This paper has shown how voluntarily leaving an insurgency organization represents much more than involuntary removal by capturing or killing. The effects of this voluntary act go beyond human capital and instrumental networks and more efficiently undermine social capital and expressive networks. These processes have been shown to alter the insurgency's social fabric and undermine trust. Moreover, the regeneration of expressive networks—and the social capital and trust that comes with them—is a much slower process than replacing human capital and expressive networks.

Not only does this mean that the social lubricant for operational security diminishes, the fear of compromise also spreads across the organization as insurgents contemplate the possible ramifications of former members complying with the state.

This paper has also suggested that when friends choose to exit their organization and expressive networks, leaving behavior spreads via social contagion. Not only does this change what life in the organization is like for the members that remain, but it helps provide information about what things are like on the outside for someone who leaves, in terms of both threats and opportunities. Contagion effects also hurt the insurgency campaign's efforts to recruit new members in the opposite manner by letting those potential recruits on the outside know what it is like on the inside.

C. IMPLICATIONS

The findings of this paper suggest several factors to take into account when considering the strategy of a disengagement program. These include:

1) Consider the program's goals. Although disengagement can help to defeat an insurgency campaign, it comes with real economic and social costs to the more benevolent members of society. Rather than offering inducements to all members of the insurgency, the strategy should be as distinct and efficient as possible in achieving its stated goals. Programs designed to catalyze the demise of an already faltering insurgency will differ from those meant to reduce the number of fighters, fracture leaders, or undermine a campaign's ideology.

2) Timing will be an important factor when considering disengagement program objectives, as well as the membership level(s) it targets and the incentives it offers. Most significantly, the lifecycle stage of the insurgency campaign should be considered, as well as the state's capacity to govern and provide security at the time.

3) Recognize the importance of monitoring. Recidivism must be avoided as often as possible, and those that have disengaged must be protected. To achieve this, relocation, protection by security forces, and integration with security force efforts to defeat the insurgency should be considered.

4) Consider disengagement program features that have the potential to exploit social contagion within expressive networks. An example of this is offering additional inducements for disengaged insurgents who convince fighters with whom they are socially connected to duplicate their departure from violence.

5) Recognize the importance of presenting valid threats that complement disengagement inducements and enhance their appeal as a feasible alternative. Increased size and capacity of security forces and the threat of capture and infiltration are examples of 'sticks' that can make the 'carrot' of disengagement a relatively more viable option.

D. POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

To validate the conclusions drawn by this paper with a greater level of rigor, more detailed data is required than what is currently available. The most significant gap exists in data that provides insight into the psychosocial processes of individual insurgents that have disengaged from violence. To more adequately appreciate these processes and the effects of individual disengagement on the organization as a whole, surveys and interviews should be conducted with those persons who participated in disengagement programs in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Their social networks should also be analyzed. These data could also be used to verify the conclusion that disengagement phenomena align with expressive and instrumental network relationships. Additionally, examination of these data by time and location should help more precisely determine the effects of social contagion. Similar to the data presented in the Malayan study, individual reasons for surrender should be examined since what motivates an insurgent to disengage is too often considered as a rational choice rather than a function of psychosocial processes and personal network relationships.

E. CONCLUSION

Although disengagement cannot be the cornerstone of a counterinsurgency strategy, it holds great promise to help reduce an organization's capacity to conduct violence and help bring about an insurgency's demise more quickly. Resources are not

endless and disengagement provides a cost effective way to accomplish these objectives with less of a burden on security forces. The more appropriate and precise a disengagement program is, the less its economic costs.

Social costs must also be considered in a program's design. The reaction by society is likely to be negative to some extent, particularly on the basis of the rank of the disengaged, the inducements offered relative to the economic status of those citizens who were never active in the insurgency, and when the insurgency is in a state of decline and faces inevitable defeat—the very time this paper asserts disengagement will be most effective. Acceptance by society is arguably the most problematic aspect of any disengagement program. Because of this, sentiment toward these efforts must be appreciated prior to implementation and monitored throughout.

That said, understanding the effects of appropriately targeted disengagement programs on insurgency campaigns and their members helps to best inform U.S. policy where these efforts are concerned. After all, successful disengagement programs reduce the social, political, and human costs of efforts to defeat insurgency campaigns. They complement the repressive measures that bear extreme economic and human costs. Where individuals are able to disengage from insurgency campaigns without personal danger or risk of returning to their old ways, they will be able rejoin their families, convince their friends to likewise depart from violence, and make vital contributions to civil society.

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